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INTRODUCTION
Since its inception in the Progressive Era, the modern administra-
tive state has functioned in tandem with the three intellectual prop-
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erty doctrines enforced by the federal government—patent, copyright, 
and trademark law.  Although administrative law and these intellec-
tual property doctrines have shared a common provenance—defined, 
promulgated, and enforced through federal institutions, statutes, and 
case law—administrative lawyers did not discuss intellectual property, 
and intellectual property lawyers similarly did not discuss administra-
tive law.1  Throughout the twentieth century, administrative law and 
intellectual property law seemed as if they were hermetically sealed off 
from each other in both theory and practice. 
In recent years, the self-imposed segregation between these two 
legal regimes has finally broken down.  In the 1990s, legal scholars 
began to explore the doctrinal and institutional relationships between 
patents and the administrative state,2 and some patent scholars have 
since called for a theoretical reframing of patent doctrine “through 
the lens of regulation.”3  In 1999, the Supreme Court seemed to agree 
with this growing cadre of academic scholarship, concluding in Dickin-
son v. Zurko that the Administrative Procedure Act applies to the Fed-
eral Circuit’s review of the regulations promulgated by the Patent and 
Trademark Office (PTO).4  In its March 2009 decision in Tafas v. Doll,
the Federal Circuit took another step toward integrating patent law 
with the administrative state, applying Chevron deference to the PTO’s 
procedural rulemaking.5  However, the fractured panel decision virtu-
ally guarantees further appellate litigation (both a petition for rehear-
1 See, e.g., Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Who’s Afraid of the APA?  What the 
Patent System Can Learn from Administrative Law, 95 GEO. L.J. 269, 270 (2007) (noting 
that “inattention to administrative law principles has long been a striking feature of the 
patent system”); John F. Duffy, The FCC and the Patent System:  Progressive Ideals, Jackson-
ian Realism, and the Technology of Regulation, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 1071, 1079 (2000) (ob-
serving that “the patent system . . . has been customarily ignored in studies of adminis-
trative regulation”); Craig Allen Nard, Deference, Defiance, and the Useful Arts, 56 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 1415, 1420-21 (1995) (observing that “an analysis of the appropriate allocation 
of interpretive authority between the Federal Circuit and PTO, in the context of patent 
law, has never fully been performed”). 
2 See Orin S. Kerr, Rethinking Patent Law in the Administrative State, 42 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 127, 127 n.1 (2000) (citing sources from the 1990s discussing the PTO as an 
administrative agency); see also sources cited supra note 1. 
3 Shubha Ghosh, Patents and the Regulatory State:  Rethinking the Patent Bargain Meta-
phor After Eldred, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1315, 1388 (2004). 
4 527 U.S. 150, 152 (1999). 
5 Tafas v. Doll, No. 08-1352, 2009 WL 723353, at *5 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 20, 2009) 
(Prost, J.) (“Thus, on review of a procedural rule that has been issued by the USPTO, 
we will give Chevron deference to the USPTO’s interpretation of statutory provisions 
that relate to the exercise of its delegated authority.”). 
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ing en banc and a certiorari petition to the Supreme Court).6  Regard-
less of the outcome in the appeals process, there will be substantial 
litigation on remand as well.7
Throughout this doctrinal and scholarly tumult at the recently 
discovered nexus between patents and the administrative state, the 
conventional wisdom maintains that administrative law and intellec-
tual property law are two separate legal regimes that were born in 
separate political epochs and that have evolved as distinct doctrines.8
There is a kernel of truth to this standard story.  Unlike patents and 
copyrights, whose protection under federal law began in 1790, the 
modern administrative state was born in the Progressive Era.  In con-
trast to the limited functions of the federal government in the early 
years of the American Republic, such as creating private rights in pat-
ents and copyrights under a specific enumerated power in the Consti-
tution,9 the Progressives took the reigns of government at a time when 
many people were seeking greater federal involvement in the eco-
nomic and social conflicts precipitated by the Industrial Revolution.10
Accordingly, the administrative state first concerned itself with 
groundbreaking public regulation of industrial and commercial uses 
6 See id. at *17 (Bryson, J., concurring) (rejecting the distinction adopted in Judge 
Prost’s opinion on procedural versus substantive rules and arguing that “it is unneces-
sary to decide whether deference would be due to the agency’s interpretation of its 
own authority, as we conclude, even without deference, that the agency has authority 
to issue regulations of the sort issued in this case”); id. at *19 (Rader, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) (arguing that the PTO’s rules “are substantive, not proce-
dural,” and thus maintaining that the panel should “affirm the district court’s conclu-
sion that the PTO exceeded its statutory rulemaking authority”). 
7 See id. at *15 (Prost, J.) (acknowledging the “complexity of this case” and identi-
fying five additional legal and factual issues that need to be resolved on remand). 
8 See Duffy, supra note 1, at 1133 (“Unlike the sweeping delegations conferred in 
the Progressive and New Deal eras, the delegations of governmental power for the pat-
ent system were, and still are, extraordinarily narrow.”); Kerr, supra note 2, at 129 
(“The patent system operates not through regulation, but rather through the private 
law mechanisms of contract, property, and tort.”). 
9 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (“The Congress shall have power . . . . To promote the 
progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inven-
tors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.”). 
10 See, e.g., JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 7, 16 (1938) (claiming 
that “the growing interdependence of individuals” requires “that government assume 
responsibility not merely to maintain ethical levels in the economic relations of the 
members of society, but to provide for the efficient functioning of the economic proc-
esses of the state”); Francis S. Philbrick, Changing Conceptions of Property in Law, 86 U.
PA. L. REV. 691, 726 (1938) (“It is not, however, the use of ordinary property, nor the 
property of ordinary or ‘natural’ persons, that presents today serious problems of ad-
justing law to new social conditions.  Those problems arise in connection with property 
for power, and therefore primarily in connection with industrial property.”). 
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of land and chattels, imposing new federal regulatory controls on clas-
sic common law entitlements in tangible property rights.11
Yet the conventional wisdom is also mistaken, albeit at a more 
fundamental theoretical level underlying considerations of legal doc-
trines and institutional design.  Although the early administrative state 
was interested primarily in the regulation of the incidents of tangible 
property—the functioning of factories and commercial transactions—
it achieved this goal on the basis of theoretical work that effected a 
radical transformation in both constitutional law and property law.  
The scholars who did the heavy lifting in legal theory to assist the Pro-
gressives in crafting the administrative state—legal realists who were 
committed to the Progressive political agenda—had to reconceptual-
ize the nature of property entitlements as much as they had to recon-
ceptualize the institutional structure and powers of the federal gov-
ernment.12  As Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith have observed, these 
legal realists “sought to undermine the notion that property is a natu-
ral right, and thereby smooth the way for activist state intervention in 
regulating and redistributing property.”13
It has long gone unnoticed, but intellectual property played a key 
role in the legal realists’ innovative property theory, as best exempli-
fied in the work of Felix Cohen and Morris Cohen, and in the work of 
fellow travelers of legal realism, such as Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, Jr.  In their critique of the natural-rights theory of property, 
these scholars and jurists reframed property into nominalist and posi-
tivist terms.  Building on Wesley Hohfeld’s conceptual analysis of legal 
entitlements,14 they redefined property as a “bundle” of rights with the 
government’s grant of a right to exclude constituting the essential 
right that defines a legal entitlement as “property.” 
11 See Robert L. Hale, Rate Making and the Revision of the Property Concept, 22 COLUM.
L. REV. 209, 214-15 (1922) (discussing how “ownership in a manufacturing plant” is 
controlled under the law); see also Eric R. Claeys, Essay, Euclid Lives?  The Uneasy Legacy 
of Progressivism in Zoning, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 731, 731 (2004) (recounting the stan-
dard story that the “Industrial Revolution, growing cities, and motor-powered transpor-
tation all created intense land-use conflicts,” which ultimately led to the Supreme 
Court’s endorsement of zoning as a superior land-use regulatory model). 
12 See generally Eric R. Claeys, The National Regulatory State in Progressive Political The-
ory and Twentieth-Century Constitutional Law, in MODERN AMERICA AND THE LEGACY OF 
THE FOUNDING 35 (Ronald J. Pestritto & Thomas G. West eds., 2007). 
13 Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and Eco-
nomics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 365 (2001). 
14 See generally Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied 
in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710 (1917). 
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This work, however, was not a scholastic investigation into the 
metaphysics of property, an anathema to the pragmatic legal realists.  
Rather, this conceptual property theory had doctrinal traction for the 
burgeoning administrative state:  it explained that, as long as a prop-
erty owner retains the right to exclude, the government may regulate 
the use and disposition of land and chattels without violating any con-
stitutionally protected property right.15  In reconceiving property 
rights in this way, the Cohens and other legal realists relied on intel-
lectual property as their primary doctrinal evidence that property is, at 
its conceptual core, a right to exclude that is positively granted by the 
government. 
This Article uncovers this long-forgotten theoretical nexus be-
tween intellectual property and the birth of the administrative state, 
revealing an important foundational connection between two legal 
regimes that many modern scholars and courts have assumed were 
only recently linked in theory and practice.  In doing so, it makes sev-
eral contributions to the current legal disputes and theoretical analy-
ses of the regulatory status of intellectual property doctrines, particu-
larly patent law.  First, as a historical matter, it establishes that the 
administrative state and intellectual property law share an important 
theoretical pedigree in legal-realist property theory, affirming anew 
the twentieth-century refrain that “we are all legal realists now.”16  Sec-
ond, this historical insight reveals that current scholarship advancing a 
regulatory theory of intellectual property rights has substantial sup-
port in the theoretical underpinnings of the administrative state.17  To 
propose that intellectual property doctrines, such as patents, serve 
regulatory policy goals is neither as novel nor as radical as many have 
assumed it to be.  Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, this analysis 
highlights salient theoretical concerns underlying both the adminis-
trative state and modern intellectual property law.  In using intellec-
tual property in their critique of the natural-rights theory of property, 
the legal realists made some basic assumptions about the meaning of 
15 See, e.g., Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005) (“A permanent 
physical invasion, however minimal the economic cost it entails, eviscerates the owner’s 
right to exclude others from entering and using her property—perhaps the most fun-
damental of all property interests.”); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66 (1979) (reject-
ing a takings claim arising from a federal prohibition on the sale of eagle feathers be-
cause the “loss of future profits—unaccompanied by any physical property 
restriction—provides a slender reed upon which to rest a takings claim”). 
16 Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CAL. L. REV. 465, 467 (1988) (book 
review). 
17 See infra notes 182-183, 197-202 and accompanying text. 
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“labor” and “value,” which are central concepts in the natural-rights 
theory of property.  Yet, in important respects, the legal realists de-
fined these terms differently from the natural rights philosophers.  In 
other words, the legal realists failed to critique the property theory of 
the natural rights philosophers, such as John Locke, and the Ameri-
can jurists and lawyers who translated this theory into practice.18  This 
oversight suggests that the legal realists’ theoretical work on property 
may not have been as successful as the conventional wisdom assumes 
today.
This Article proceeds in three Parts.  First, it explains how the le-
gal realists reconceptualized property into both nominalist and posi-
tivist terms—as a bundle of sticks with the state’s grant of a right to 
exclude as the single essential characteristic that defines this legal en-
titlement as “property.”  It then discusses the legal realists’ justification 
for this new conception of property, detailing for the first time the ex-
act arguments and evidence used by Felix Cohen and other legal real-
ists to advance their nominalist-positivist property theory.19  This ar-
gument consists primarily of a critique of the labor-based natural-
rights theory of property, which, for ease of reference, this Article will 
refer to as “Lockean property theory.”20
Second, this Article will discuss how the legal realists’ critique of 
Lockean property theory falls short of its target insofar as it elides an 
important distinction between value and economic value (i.e., 
wealth).  The balance of Part II will explicate the distinction between 
these different senses of value and the role that property plays in both 
defining and securing value to its creators, as set forth in chapter five 
of John Locke’s Second Treatise.21  This Part will follow the lead of Felix 
Cohen and his fellow legal realists in using intellectual property rights, 
such as trademarks, trade secrets, and patents, to illustrate how the le-
gal realists failed to critique Lockean property theory on its own 
terms. 
Third, and last, this Article will discuss the recent scholarly efforts 
to reframe intellectual property rights as regulatory entitlements 
18 See infra note 145 and accompanying text. 
19 Within extant legal-realist scholarship, Felix Cohen developed the most sophis-
ticated and systemic property theory, which is probably why his work is cited often by 
modern property scholars.  Accordingly, Cohen’s arguments deserve serious consid-
eration as the best representative example of legal-realist property theory. 
20 See infra notes 86-87 and accompanying text. 
21 JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 285-302 (Peter Laslett ed., Cam-
bridge Univ. Press, student ed. 1988) (1690). 
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within the administrative state, revealing how these scholars are repli-
cating, unconsciously or otherwise, the theoretical work of early-
twentieth-century Progressives and legal realists.  This intellectual his-
tory is important because it cautions modern intellectual property 
scholars against repeating the legal realists’ errors in assuming that 
Lockean property theory provides little or no support for intellectual 
property rights.  In fact, the legal realists arguably misused intellectual 
property in critiquing Lockean property theory.  It is an empirical 
question whether this misuse of intellectual property in the theoreti-
cal work underlying the administrative state destabilizes doctrinal or 
scholarly work today, but this insight is important insofar as it may be 
implicitly framing “the second-order questions of filling in the details 
of the system.”22
I. MODERN PROPERTY THEORY
The legal realists are responsible for both the bundle metaphor 
and its attendant emphasis on the right to exclude in modern Ameri-
can property law.23  The Progressives found this reconceptualization of 
property helpful because it made it possible for the modern adminis-
trative state to control and restrict various property uses without im-
plicating the constitutional protections of the Takings or Due Process 
Clauses.24  This was first achieved not by reinterpreting these constitu-
tional provisions but by fundamentally redefining the meaning of 
“property.”25  But how did the legal realists accomplish this jurispru-
22 See Richard A. Epstein, Intellectual Property:  Old Boundaries and New Frontiers, 76 
IND. L.J. 803, 827 (2001) (stating that theoretical accounts of intellectual property help 
“make sense of the [intellectual property] system in its basic outlines,” which then ori-
ents scholars and judges toward “a set of guidelines that should help us deal with the 
second-order questions of filling in the details of the system”). 
23 See, e.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979) (stating that the 
right to exclude is “one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are 
commonly characterized as property”). 
24 See, e.g., Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 517 (1944) (upholding federal 
price control on the housing market and noting that all “forms of regulation[] may 
reduce the value of the property regulated” but “that does not mean that the regula-
tion is unconstitutional”); Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) 
(holding that zoning is a valid regulation of property use that does not violate the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 
413 (1922) (holding a mining regulation to be an unconstitutional taking but noting 
that “[g]overnment hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property 
could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the general law”). 
25 See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 28 (1977) 
(observing that the bundle conception of property “permits the [lawyer] to escape a 
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dential transformation in property law?  Interestingly, no one has yet 
answered this question. 
Within modern property scholarship, some professors simply as-
sume that the legal realists got the better of their historical predeces-
sors.26  Given the sweeping revolution wrought within American law by 
the legal realists, this assumption is not entirely unjustified.27  Yet it is 
an assumption all the same.  Even for those scholars who do not nec-
essarily agree with legal-realist property theory, no one has yet assessed 
the actual premises, lines of reasoning, and doctrinal evidence used by 
Felix Cohen and other legal realists in advancing their new property 
theory.  To date, scholars in both groups have simply described the 
shift in property theory at the turn of the last century from natural 
rights philosophy to the realist mélange of nominalism, positivism, 
and pragmatism.28  Even more important, no modern legal scholar has 
assessed whether Cohen and other legal realists actually succeeded in 
justifying this conceptual shift in property theory, which has served as 
one of the supporting pillars of the edifice of the modern administra-
tive state. 
The purpose of this Part is to fill this gap in the intellectual history 
of early-twentieth-century American property theory.  First, it will dis-
cuss the nominalist and positivist nature of legal-realist property the-
ory, what is referred to by modern legal professionals as the “bundle 
of sticks” metaphor with its attendant emphasis on the right to ex-
clude as the essential stick that defines a legal entitlement as property.  
Second, it will discuss for the first time the actual arguments used by 
the legal realists to justify this shift to the bundle metaphor and the 
exclusion conception of property, identifying the central role of intel-
lectual property within their theoretical arguments.  As such, this Part 
is descriptive, but it is necessary to set forth the basic outlines of long-
forgotten arguments before one can assess whether or not these ar-
guments were successful in justifying the now widely accepted bundle 
metaphor and exclusion conception of property. 
‘literal’ construction of the [Takings] clause that would transform him into an impla-
cable foe of the modern state”).
26 See, e.g., id. at 26-29, 98-100 (contrasting the “layman’s” view of property as thing 
ownership with the lawyer’s “scientific” analysis of property as a “bundle” of legal rela-
tions). 
27 See Singer, supra note 16, at 467 (“All major current schools of thought are, in 
significant ways, products of legal realism.  To some extent, we are all realists now.”). 
28 See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law:  Doctrine in Search of Justi-
fication, 86 CAL. L. REV. 241, 251-60 (1998); Adam Mossoff, What is Property?  Putting the 
Pieces Back Together, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 371, 372 (2003). 
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A.  Bundles of Sticks and the Right To Exclude 
A brief foray into modern property theory is necessary to set the 
background context for identifying the ways in which the legal realists 
used intellectual property in their conceptual analysis of property.  It 
is not the purpose of this section to provide a comprehensive review of 
American property theory, which would be impossible to do in a sin-
gle law journal article, let alone in a single section.  What suffices here 
is a more narrow and defensible insight:  the legal realists reconceptu-
alized property entitlements into both nominalist and positivist terms, 
popularizing within American property law the bundle metaphor and 
its attendant emphasis on the right to exclude as the essential charac-
teristic of the legal right to property.  It is also important to recognize 
that the legal realists were not interested in property theory as an end 
in itself.  These abstract conceptual moves served the political goal of 
making property more plastic as a legal and constitutional restraint on 
the then-nascent administrative state.29
It is widely recognized that modern lawyers employ a nominalist 
definition of “property.”  In their first year of law school, law students 
learn the modern orthodoxy that “property” refers to an aggregate set 
of social relations—various rights and obligations between citizens 
that are bundled together for socially contingent policy reasons.30
Thus, in contrast to the layperson who believes that “property” neces-
sarily refers to a right to use something in the world, lawyers and 
29 See Eric R. Claeys, Jefferson Meets Coase:  Land-Use Torts, Law and Economics, and 
Natural Property Rights, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 46-
47), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1117999.  Claeys writes, 
The Realists . . . needed to revise property conceptual theory for substan-
tive political reasons.  The political assumptions informing their conception of 
social science led them to believe that resource uses could and needed to be 
managed by experts applying “scientific” conceptions of social efficiency.  If 
the concept “property” is a nominalist term—that is, if “property” refers to 
“that which the law happens to call property in a particular case”—the term 
would allow experts to manage particular uses of property in particular re-
source disputes without needing to worry overmuch that the conceptual struc-
ture of property might limit their efforts. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
30 See JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 81 (6th ed. 2006) (defining property as 
comprising “a number of disparate rights, a ‘bundle’ of them:  the right to possess, the 
right to use, the right to exclude, the right to transfer”); JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER,
PROPERTY LAW, at xxxix, xlix (4th ed. 2006) (noting that “[o]wners of property gener-
ally possess a bundle of entitlements” and that property theory helps justify the nature and 
scope of these intricate “social relations”). 
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judges employ the well-worn metaphor that it comprises only a “bun-
dle of sticks.”31
The progenitor of this nominalist “bundle” metaphor was Wesley 
Hohfeld’s conceptual reconstruction of property into an assortment 
of rights, privileges, powers, and immunities.32  The legal realists, 
though, are responsible for giving Hohfeld’s somewhat abstruse ter-
minological analysis its traction within the minds of more practically 
oriented American lawyers and judges.33  After legal realism effected 
its revolution in American law in the early twentieth century, lawyers 
and judges conceived of property in the nominalist terms of “social 
relationships”34 or “legal relations.”35  By 1934, Walton Hamilton fa-
mously defined property as “a euphonious collocation of letters which 
serves as a general term for the miscellany of equities that persons 
hold in the commonwealth.”36
As I and others have often pointed out, Thomas Grey was correct 
in observing that the legal realists fragmented the “robust unitary 
conception of ownership into a more shadowy ‘bundle of rights,’” 
31 Gerald Korngold & Andrew P. Morris, Introduction:  The Story of Property Stories, 
in PROPERTY STORIES 1 (Gerald Korngold & Andrew P. Morris eds., 2004); see also
United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 278 (2002) (“A common idiom describes property 
as a ‘bundle of sticks’—a collection of individual rights which, in certain combinations, 
constitute property.”); STEPHEN R. MUNZER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY 16-17 (1990) (dis-
cussing the “sophisticated conception” of property as a “bundle of ‘sticks’” or a set of 
legal “relations among persons or other entities with respect to things”).
32 See generally Hohfeld, supra note 14. 
33 See, e.g., BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE 129 (1928) 
(“The bundle of power and privileges to which we give the name of ownership is not 
constant through the ages.  The faggots must be put together and rebound from time 
to time.”). 
34 Felix S. Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 9 RUTGERS L. REV. 357, 361-63 
(1954); see also 1 RICHARD T. ELY, PROPERTY AND CONTRACT IN THEIR RELATION TO THE 
DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH 96 (1914) (“The essence of property is in the relations 
among men arising out of their relations to things.” (emphasis omitted)); ALEXANDER 
LINDSAY, ESSAY IN PROPERTY: ITS DUTIES AND RIGHTS 70 (2d ed. 1922) (“[P]rivate 
property . . . . is a right vested in individuals thought of as set over against one another, 
and it requires the recognition and protection of society for its existence.”); Hohfeld, 
supra note 14, at 743 (“[T]he supposed single right in rem [in property] . . . really in-
volves as many separate and distinct ‘right-duty’ relations as there are persons subject 
to a duty . . . .”). 
35 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY ch. 1, introductory note (1936); see also Ar-
thur L. Corbin (A.L.C.), Comment, Taxation of Seats on the Stock Exchange, 31 YALE L.J. 
429, 429 (1922) (“Our concept of property has shifted . . . . ‘[P]roperty’ has ceased to 
describe any res, or object of sense, at all, and has become merely a bundle of legal re-
lations . . . .”). 
36 Walton H. Hamilton & Irene Till, Property, in 11 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE SOCIAL 
SCIENCES 528, 528 (Edwin R.A. Seligman & Alvin Johnson eds., 1937). 
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which “disintegrated” property as an internally cohesive legal con-
cept.37  Unlike David Hume, who felt that he could safely leave his 
metaphysical skepticism at his writing desk when he reengaged the 
ordinary world of human activities,38 the legal realists knew their 
nominalism concerned a legal concept that was used by everyday law-
yers and judges.  And, as Hamlet put it, there was the rub:  all legal 
concepts, such as contracts and torts, refer to specified sets of legal re-
lationships.  If property was defined tautologically as a collection of 
legal relationships, then there was nothing to distinguish “property” as 
a species within the genus of law.  If property was to remain a viable 
and determinate legal concept within the legal realists’ social concep-
tion of legal rights, then they had to, in Felix Cohen’s words, “get rid 
of the confusion of nomimalism.”39
Cohen and his legal-realist brethren succeeded in ridding them-
selves of the disintegrating effects of nominalism by finding refuge in 
positivism.  In this way, they maintained their commitment to the so-
cial definition of property, but they recognized that there was one es-
sential social characteristic of property that was not shared with other 
legal concepts—the state’s grant to a citizen of the right to exclude 
others.40  Felix Cohen thus proffered a new “realistic definition of pri-
vate property”41 in his article Dialogue on Private Property:  “Private 
37 Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in PROPERTY: NOMOS XXII, at 69, 
69 ( J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980); see also Nestor M. Davidson, 
Standardization and Pluralism in Property Law, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1597, 1646-47 (2008) 
(recognizing that the legal realists had an “anti-essentialist focus on the legally con-
structed and contingent nature of property” that was “predicated on the disintegration 
of property into constituent elements”); Mossoff, supra note 28, at 372-74 (identifying 
the same point and citing others who have also observed this problem). 
38 See DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 269 (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., Ox-
ford University Press 2d ed. 1978) (1793); see also DAVID HUME, ENQUIRIES CONCERN-
ING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING AND CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS 160 (L.A. 
Selby-Bigge ed., Oxford University Press 3d ed. 1975) (1777). 
39 Cohen, supra note 34, at 378; cf. Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Prop-
erty, 108 YALE L.J. 1163, 1193 (1999) (“While the modern bundle-of-legal relations 
metaphor reflects well the possibility of complex relational fragmentation, it gives a 
weak sense of the ‘thingness’ of private property.”). 
40 See, e.g., Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 246 (1918) (Holmes, 
J., dissenting) (asserting that “[p]roperty depends upon exclusion by law from inter-
ference”); id. at 250 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“An essential element of individual 
property is the legal right to exclude others from enjoying it.”); Hamilton & Till, supra
note 36, at 536 (“It is incorrect to say that the judiciary protected property; rather they 
called that property to which they accorded protection.”); Hohfeld, supra note 14, at 
745-46 (explaining that the right to exclude is the only claim-right constituting the in 
rem legal relation among citizens known as “property”). 
41 Cohen, supra note 34, at 378. 
2012 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 157: 2001
property is a relationship among human beings such that the so-called 
owner can exclude others from certain activities or permit others to 
engage in those activities and in either case secure the assistance of 
the law in carrying out his decision.”42
Cohen’s insight here was hardly novel (and he admitted as much).  
In his work, Felix Cohen cited his father and fellow legal realist, Mor-
ris Cohen, who wrote in the 1920s that “the essence of private prop-
erty is always the right to exclude others.”43  Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, Jr., a fellow traveler of the legal realists, had written several 
decades earlier that the essence of property is that an “owner is al-
lowed to exclude all, and is accountable to no one.”44
The claim that the right to exclude is the essential characteristic 
of the legally protected entitlement known as “property” soon became 
orthodoxy within modern property theory.  By the end of the twenti-
eth century, the Supreme Court confidently asserted that the right to 
exclude is “one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that 
are commonly characterized as property.”45  Thomas Merrill, a leading 
property scholar, has gone a step further, declaring that “the right to 
exclude others is more than just ‘one of the most essential’ constitu-
ents of property—it is the sine qua non.”46
It has become commonplace to identify the legal realists as the 
fountainhead for the nominalist “bundle” metaphor.47  This is true, 
but the legal realists more rightly deserve credit for the positivist claim 
in American property law that the right to exclude is the essence of 
the legal entitlement referred to as “property.”  This is important inso-
far as prominent property scholars today critique the legal realists’ 
“bundle” conception of property,48 while at the same time advancing 
42 Id. at 373. 
43 Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8, 12 (1927). 
44 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 246 (1881). 
45 Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979); see also Coll. Sav. Bank v. 
Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 673 (1999) (“The hall-
mark of a protected property interest is the right to exclude others.”). 
46 Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 730 
(1998).
47 See Eric R. Claeys, Property 101:  Is Property a Thing or a Bundle?, 32 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. 617, 635 (2009) (book review) (“Contemporary property scholars . . . often as-
sume that the ad hoc bundle conception was the only legacy from Realist property 
scholarship.”); Merrill & Smith, supra note 13, at 365 (claiming that the bundle of 
rights metaphor “became popular among the legal realists in the 1920s and 1930s”). 
48 See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 46, at 737 (“For the Realists, property was not de-
fined by a single right or definitive trilogy of rights.  Rather it is a ‘bundle of rights.’ 
Moreover, this bundle has no fixed core or constituent elements.”). 
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(apparently without realizing it) the legal realists’ exclusion conception 
of property.49  Until the legal realists are recognized as the source of 
both the bundle metaphor and exclusion conceptions of property, the 
nexus between realist property theory and modern intellectual property 
law will remain lost within the record of American legal history.50
B. The Use of IP To Redefine Property in Land 
The legal realists’ revolution in property theory, especially in their 
redefinition of this legal entitlement in terms of the right to exclude, 
was predicated on a scathing critique of Lockean property theory.  
Their arguments were very much of the form that, given the logical 
incoherence of Lockean property theory, their claim that property 
comprises a state-granted right to exclude wins by default.  As has 
been observed of the legal realists, their arguments were primarily 
critical—they stood more for what they were not than for what they 
were.51
As a result, the legal realists’ explanation for the merits of both 
the bundle metaphor and the exclusion conception of property was a 
bit thin.  On one hand, their positing of the nominalist bundle meta-
phor often constituted nothing more than a bald assertion.52  In an ar-
ticle in the Yale Law Journal in 1932, for instance, Hamilton believed it 
49 See THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY, at v (2007) (claiming 
that “property at its core entails the right to exclude others from some discrete thing”); 
Merrill, supra note 46, at 754 (asserting that “property means the right to exclude oth-
ers from valued resources, no more and no less”). 
50 Cf. Adam Mossoff, Exclusion and Exclusive Use in Patent Law, 22 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 321, 360-70 (2009) (identifying a nexus between the legal realists’ exclusion 
conception of property theory and modern patent theory). 
51 See Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism—Responding to Dean Pound, 44 
HARV. L. REV. 1222, 1233-34 (1931) (observing that the legal realists were not of one 
mind on any issue in law or politics); see also NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN 
JURISPRUDENCE 69 (1995) (“Realism was more a mood than a movement. That mood 
was one of dissatisfaction with legal formalism . . . .”). 
52 See CARDOZO, supra note 33, at 129 (“The bundle of power and privileges to 
which we give the name of ownership is not constant through the ages.”); Corbin, su-
pra note 35, at 429 (asserting that “‘property’ has ceased to describe any res, or object 
of sense, at all, and has become merely a bundle of legal relations—rights, powers, 
privileges, immunities”); Hale, supra note 11, at 214 (“The right of ownership in a 
manufacturing plant is, to use Hohfeld’s terms, a privilege to operate the plant, plus a 
privilege not to operate it, plus a right to keep others from operating it, plus a power to 
acquire all the rights of ownership in the products.”); see also J.E. Penner, The “Bundle of 
Rights” Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 711, 714 (1996) (observing that “‘[p]roperty 
is a bundle of rights’ is little more than a slogan” and noting that “[t]here is no real 
theory that property is a bundle of rights”). 
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sufficient to criticize a contemporary scholar’s analysis of Lockean 
property theory by simply pointing out that the “pages are barren of a 
Hohfeldian analysis of the wousin called property into the conglom-
erate mass of rights, duties, privileges, and immunities which make it 
up.”53
On the other hand, the legal realists’ argument that property is 
essentially the right to exclude (granted and enforced by the state) 
was a bit more substantive.  Of course, even in arguing the positive 
case for the right to exclude, the legal realists spoke in their character-
istically strident rhetoric.  At the outset, they rejected the long-
standing definition of property in American law:  “Property is the ex-
clusive right of possessing, enjoying, and disposing of a thing.”54  This 
definition, according to Felix Cohen, represented “the ‘thingification’ 
of property,” which perpetuated a myth that “courts are not creating
property, but are merely recognizing a pre-existent Something.”55
Cohen dismissed this as “transcendental nonsense,”56 which reflected 
the “metaphysical doctrine of Duns Scotus, William of Occam, and 
other 14th and 15th century scholastics who held that all reality is tan-
gible and exists in space.”57
There was a substantive argument behind this bluster, and within 
it we can identify two separate prongs, although the legal realists did 
not structure their argument in precisely this way.  The first part con-
stituted a conceptual claim about the proper definition of property, 
and the second part constituted a logical critique of Lockean property 
theory.  The first part of their argument—the conceptual claim that 
property is essentially the right to exclude—was neither lengthy nor 
complex.  Felix Cohen and other scholars and judges, such as Wesley 
Hohfeld, Morris Cohen, and Justice Holmes, repeatedly observed that 
53 Walton H. Hamilton, Property—According to Locke, 41 YALE L.J. 864, 865 (1932) 
(citing PASCHAL LARKIN, PROPERTY IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY (1930)). 
54 McKeon v. Bisbee, 9 Cal. 137, 143 (1858); see also Vanhorne’s Lessee v. Dor-
rance, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304, 310 (1795) (“[T]he right of acquiring and possessing prop-
erty, and having it protected, is one of the natural, inherent, and unalienable rights of 
man.”); City of Denver v. Bayer, 2 P. 6, 6-7 (Colo. 1883) (“Property, in its broader and 
more appropriate sense, is not alone the chattel or the land itself, but the right to 
freely possess, use, and alienate the same . . . .”); Eaton v. B. C. & M. R.R., 51 N.H. 504, 
511 (1872) (“Property is the right of any person to possess, use, enjoy, and dispose of a 
thing.” (quoting Wynehamer v. People, 13 N.Y. 378, 433 (1856))). 
55 Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM.
L. REV. 809, 815 (1935). 
56 Id. at 809. 
57 Cohen, supra note 34, at 361. 
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the law secured incorporeal entitlements as “property,” such as pat-
ents, copyrights, and goodwill.58  As such, they maintained that there 
was simply no basis whatsoever to define property according to physi-
cal possession or use of a thing in the real world.  Arthur Corbin thus 
observed, “Our concept of property has shifted; incorporeal rights 
have become property.”59
According to Felix Cohen, the transcendental nonsense in the 
“thingification of property” was especially clear in light of intellectual 
property rights, such as a “patent on a chemical process.”60  Such a 
patent was incapable of being physically possessed like land or a fox,61
but no one denied that patents are legally enforced property rights.  
Accordingly, patents are property if and only if the state enforces an 
inventor’s right to exclude others from using the legally protected in-
vention.62  If the right to exclude is the single legal relation that de-
fined patents and other intellectual property rights as “property,” mu-
tatis mutandis, land and chattels must also be defined by the same 
essential element of a state-granted right to exclude.  QED. 
Unlike Justice Holmes and Morris Cohen,63 Felix Cohen did not 
rest on his laurels with this somewhat simple analytical argument.  
Cohen further argued that the positivist redefinition of property in 
terms of the right to exclude also revealed how the “vicious circle in-
herent in [Lockean property theory] is plain.”64  The problem was 
Lockean property theory’s claim that the law secured the valuable 
fruits of one’s labors. 
In his Dialogue on Private Property, Cohen explained that property 
constitutes the grant of a right to exclude others by the state, and thus 
any value in something is merely a consequent of creating this legal 
entitlement—not an antecedent.  If it were otherwise, as Felix Cohen 
58 See Mossoff, supra note 50, at 360-65 (discussing the realists’ use of patents and 
other IP rights to justify the conceptual claim that “property” means only a right to ex-
clude).
59 Corbin, supra note 35, at 429. 
60 Cohen, supra note 34, at 360. 
61 See Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823) (upholding first posses-
sion for claiming land as property); Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805) 
(upholding the rule of capture for claiming property in wild animals). 
62 Felix Cohen summarized “property in terms of a simple label” as follows:  “To 
the world:  Keep off X unless you have my permission, which I may grant or withhold.  
Signed:  Private Citizen.  Endorsed:  The state.”  Cohen, supra note 34, at 374 (italics 
added).
63 See HOLMES, supra note 44, at 246; Cohen, supra note 43, at 45. 
64 Cohen, supra note 55, at 815. 
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aptly put it, then it would be logically impossible to have valueless 
property, such as purely personal papers that are meaningful only to 
their author.65  If value inexorably leads to property, it would also be 
logically impossible to have valuable nonproperty, such as clean air.66
Yet no one doubts that personal papers are property and that clean air 
is not property; neither of these propositions is equivalent to claiming 
that one can square a circle.  Thus, it is undeniable “that not only is 
there valueless property, but there is also propertyless value.”67  Cohen 
drove the conceptual point home:  “in short, property is not wealth.”68
In another seminal article, Transcendental Nonsense and the Func-
tional Approach, Felix Cohen directly criticized the circular legal rea-
soning that he believed was inherent in the claim that property arose 
from the valuable prelegal labor and use of something in the world.  
Here, Cohen used trademark doctrine to illustrate what he saw as the 
fundamental illogic of this basic tenet of Lockean property theory.69
He first observed that courts increasingly have departed from tradi-
tional trademark theory’s concerns about unfair competition and con-
sumer protection, and have instead justified trademark protection ac-
cording to Lockean property theory.70  Cohen was incorrect in his 
historical claim, as courts had long secured trademarks under 
Lockean property theory.71  In 1849, for instance, a New York court 
issued an injunction on a finding of trademark infringement on the 
grounds that “the [trademark] owner is robbed of the fruits of the 
reputation that he had successfully labored to earn.”72  Thus, Cohen’s 
critique had a greater theoretical and historical bite than he even real-
ized. 
65 Cohen, supra note 34, at 363-64. 
66 Id. at 364. 
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Modern trademark law is conceptually muddled.  Cohen recognized that the 
doctrine is muddled, but he argued that trademarks are classified conceptually as 
“property” because courts permit trademark owners to obtain “injunctive relief,” which 
is the legal remedy that enforces the right to exclude.  Cohen, supra note 55, at 814.  In 
fact, law and economics now identifies legal entitlements providing for injunctive relief 
as “property rules.”  See generally Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, 
Liability Rules, and Inalienability:  One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972) 
(setting forth the now-famous property rule (injunction) and liability rule (damages) 
distinction). 
70 Cohen, supra note 55, at 814. 
71 See Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1839, 1873-85 (2007). 
72 Amoskeag Mfg. Co. v. Spear, 2 Sand. Ch. 599, 606 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1849). 
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Cohen nonetheless preferred to focus on trademark cases of more 
recent vintage,73 and he restated the “current legal argument” for pro-
tecting trademarks as property rights as follows: 
[1] One who by the ingenuity of his advertising or the quality of his 
product . . . has thereby created a thing of value; 
[2] a thing of value is property; 
[3] [therefore] the creator of property is entitled to protection against 
third parties who seek to deprive him of his property.74
The circularity, according to Cohen, is in the second premise:  a 
thing of value is property.  What makes something potentially valuable 
is not some characteristic or feature that preexists the law; it is the le-
gal classification of this thing as property—whether it be a trademark, 
land, a share of stock, or anything else to which a court or legislature 
attaches a right to exclude.  As Justice Holmes pointed out in INS v. 
Associated Press,75 in which he dissented from the Court’s decision to 
extend property protection over valuable news items that were ob-
tained from the labors of a news organization, “[p]roperty, a creation 
of law, does not arise from value . . . . Property depends upon exclu-
sion by law from interference . . . .”76  In court decisions protecting 
land, chattels, trademarks, or some other form of exclusive entitle-
ment, the legal realists and their fellow travelers maintained that value 
is a consequent of the legal classification of something as property, 
not an antecedent.  In saying otherwise, Lockean property theory was 
incoherent.  As English Progressive and property theorist Alexander 
Lindsay concluded, “[t]he attempt to make the right of property in-
herent in the individual apart from society is false to the facts of the 
creation of wealth.”77
The legal realists’ arguments about property had a profound im-
pact beyond the confines of straightforward property doctrines, such 
73 See Cohen, supra note 55, at 815 n.18 (discussing Am. Agric. Chem. Co. v. 
Moore, 17 F.2d 196 (M.D. Ala. 1927)). 
74 Id. at 815.  This is a formalized representation of Cohen’s sentence.  It could be 
symbolically presented as A B, B = C, A, C.
75 248 U.S. 215 (1918). 
76 Id. at 246 (Holmes, J., dissenting in part). 
77 LINDSAY, supra note 34, at 70.  Lindsay’s work was known to the American legal 
realists. See, e.g., MORRIS R. COHEN & FELIX S. COHEN, READINGS IN JURISPRUDENCE 
AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 98-99 (1951) (reproducing an excerpt of Lindsay’s Essay in 
Property:  Its Duties and Rights, supra note 34). 
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as the estates system and restrictive covenants.78  In fact, the legal real-
ists were not interested in property theory as such.  Their work was 
part and parcel of a broader political program that sought to direct 
the use, development, and disposal of land and chattels through regu-
latory rules crafted by experts staffing the newly created federal and 
state administrative agencies.79  Politically, the legal realists’ argument 
succeeded, and the administrative state is now a fact of the modern 
American constitutional order.  Theoretically, however, there remains 
an open question as to whether the legal realists’ arguments about the 
illogic of Lockean property theory succeeded or not, which was the 
sole argument in favor of their claim to the logical necessity of defin-
ing property in terms of the right to exclude.  This assessment of the 
details of legal-realist property theory, including its use of intellectual 
property, is the purpose of Part II. 
II. THE ABUSE OF IP TO REDEFINE PROPERTY IN LAND
The legal realists have been accused of “bombast” and “broad-
brushed polemic,”80 and Felix Cohen’s accusation that Lockean prop-
erty theory is “transcendental nonsense” on par with other “transcen-
dental conceptions of God, matter, the Absolute, essence and acci-
dent, substance and attribute,”81 seems to fall within the scope of this 
criticism.  Yet Cohen’s property theory made substantive points, and it 
was not simply hyperbolic rhetoric.  The positivist conception of 
property as securing only a right to exclude was predicated on the 
work of Jeremy Bentham and other utilitarian philosophers.82  Even 
78 See, e.g., Sommer v. Kridel, 378 A.2d 767, 772-73 (N.J. 1977) (holding that “anti-
quated real property concepts which served as the basis for the pre-existing rule, shall 
no longer be controlling,” and that “claims must be governed by more modern notions 
of fairness and equity”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 1.4, § 1.4 
cmt. a (2000) (eliminating the distinction between real covenants and equitable servi-
tudes because “much of the 19th century complexity is irrelevant and unnecessary”). 
79 See Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 394-95 (1926) (holding 
that zoning regulations are not arbitrary because “zoning has received much attention 
at the hands of commissions and experts” and their comprehensive reports “bear every 
evidence of painstaking consideration”). 
80 DUXBURY, supra note 51, at 112 (referring to Fred Rodell and Thurman Arnold). 
81 Cohen, supra note 55, at 826. 
82 See JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 231 (Wilfrid E. 
Rumble ed., 1995) (1832) (“Every legal right is the creature of positive law.”); JEREMY 
BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 113 (C.K. Ogden ed., Richard Hildreth trans., 
Routlege & Kegan Paul Ltd. 1931) (1864) (“Property and law are born together, and 
die together.  Before laws were made there was no property; take away laws, and prop-
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the “bundle” metaphor was first employed several decades before the 
legal-realist revolution in the 1910s and 1920s.83  The legal realists 
simply gave the bundle metaphor its theoretical (and doctrinal) trac-
tion within American property law.  Moreover, Cohen’s functionalist 
account of the law, from property to jurisdiction to due process, was 
grounded in the pragmatic philosophy of C.S. Peirce, William James, 
and John Dewey.84  Cohen was certainly standing on the shoulders of 
these philosophers when he pronounced that “[a]ll concepts that 
cannot be defined in terms of the elements of actual experience are 
meaningless.”85
The purpose of this Part is to reconsider Felix Cohen’s critique of 
Lockean property theory, as further supported in the work of other 
realists, such as Morris Cohen.  Since the legal realists’ arguments 
were principally critical, it is first necessary to set forth a basic outline 
of Lockean property theory.  Given John Locke’s influence in early 
American politics and law,86 his argument for the natural right to 
property serves nicely as an exemplar of natural rights philosophy.  To 
the extent that some scholars are skeptical of Locke’s actual influence 
on early American political and legal thought,87 his property theory 
simply serves as an easily recognized proxy for natural-rights property 
theory generally.  Once the framework of Locke’s property theory has 
erty ceases.”); see also Philbrick, supra note 10, at 729 (citing Bentham for the proposi-
tion that “property is the creature and dependent of law”). 
83 See Penner, supra note 52, at 713 n.8 (discussing the provenance of the bundle 
metaphor in the late 1800s). 
84 See Cohen, supra note 55, at 826 (advancing a functionalist account of law based 
in the pragmatic and positivist philosophy “vigorously pressed by C. S. Peirce, James, 
Dewey, Russell, Whitehead, C. I. Lewis, C. D. Broad, and most recently by the Viennese 
School, primarily by Wittgenstein and Carnap”). 
85 Id.
86 See Richard A. Epstein, No New Property, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 747, 750 (1990) (ob-
serving that American property lawyers are the “inheritors of the Lockean tradition”). 
87 See, e.g., David L. Wardle, Reason to Ratify:  The Influence of John Locke’s Religious 
Beliefs on the Creation and Adoption of the United States Constitution, 26 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
291, 297 (2002) (“Locke’s influence on the Constitution was not as strong in the actual 
substance and form of the document as that of Montesquieu; rather, it was more indi-
rect, creating an atmosphere in early America conducive to its creation and adop-
tion.”); see also GARRY WILLS, INVENTING AMERICA: JEFFERSON’S DECLARATION OF INDE-
PENDENCE 171-75 (1978) (arguing that Locke had little to no influence in the actual 
writing of the Declaration of Independence); Jason F. Robinson, Book Review:  Gerber’s 
To Secure These Rights, 12 J.L. & POL. 123, 132-33 (1996) (“Since the mid-1960s, his-
torians have challenged the prevailing Lockean interpretation of the American found-
ing, arguing that the American revolutionaries were concerned less with individual 
rights and limited government than with the cultivation of a virtuous, public-spirited 
citizenry willing to sacrifice individual self interest for the greater public good.”). 
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been set up, it can then serve as the foil against which to evaluate its 
critique by Felix Cohen and other legal realists. 
A.  Lockean Property Theory:  Labor, Value, and Property 
John Locke articulated his famous and influential version of the 
labor theory of property in chapter five of the Second Treatise.  In the 
theory’s bare-bones outline,88 Locke first proposes that “Labour, in the 
Beginning, gave a Right of Property, where-ever any one was pleased to 
imploy it, upon what was common.”89  Locke then argues that “’tis La-
bour indeed that puts the difference of value on every thing.”90  The prem-
ises of the argument are clear:  value is necessarily created by labor, as 
this term is defined by Locke,91 and labor is the necessary and suffi-
cient condition for creating property in the state of nature.92  The 
creation of value therefore is a necessary element in the creation of a 
property right deserving of protection under the law in civil society.  
The legal implication of Lockean property theory is inescapable:  if 
the purpose of the state is to secure property rights,93 then the law 
should secure as property the valuable products and services created 
by original laborers.  As Justice William Patterson wrote in Vanhorne’s 
Lessee v. Dorrance in 1798, “[n]o man would become a member of a 
community, in which he could not enjoy the fruits of his honest la-
bour and industry.”94
88 The specifics of Locke’s property theory will be explicated in greater detail at 
the relevant points in assessing Felix Cohen’s critique.  See, e.g., infra notes 147-160 and 
accompanying text (discussing how “labor” refers to “production” in Locke’s property 
theory).
89 LOCKE, supra note 21, at 299.  In his famous mixing-labor argument for prop-
erty, Locke claims “[t]he labour that was mine, removing [things] out of that common 
state they were in, hath fixed my Property in them.”  Id. at 289. 
90 Id. at 296. 
91 See Adam Mossoff, Locke’s Labor Lost, 9 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 155 (2002) 
(discussing Locke’s thick notion of “labor” in his theory of property); see also STEPHEN 
BUCKLE, NATURAL LAW AND THE THEORY OF PROPERTY 151 (1991) (“The doctrine of 
the origin of property through labor will not properly be understood if it is not recog-
nized that Locke thinks of labour as a rational (or purposeful), value-creating activ-
ity.”). 
92 See LOCKE, supra note 21, at 292 (“The Measure of Property, Nature has well set, 
by the Extent of Mens[’] Labour . . . .”). 
93 See id. at 350 (observing that people “joyn [sic] in Society . . . for the mutual 
Preservation of their Lives, Liberties and Estates, which I call by the general Name, Prop-
erty”).
94 Vanhorne’s Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304, 310 (1795). 
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The impact of Locke’s property theory on early Americans was 
tremendous.  One illustrative example is James Madison’s 1792 essay, 
aptly titled Property.95  In this short essay, published in the National Ga-
zette, Madison argued that “property” is sometimes used in a strictly le-
gal sense, referring to “a man’s land, or merchandize, or money,” but 
that this term also has a “larger and juster meaning, [in which] it em-
braces every thing to which a man may attach a value and have a 
right.”96  Madison thus condemned any government action that “vio-
lates [individuals’] property, in their actual possessions [or] in the la-
bor that acquires their daily subsistence.”97  In the Founding Era and in 
the Antebellum Era, Madison was not alone among American political 
and legal scholars in his commitment to Lockean property theory.98
Beyond political tracts and legal treatises, jurists in the nineteenth 
century often employed Lockean property theory to define the mean-
ing of property within American law.  Justice David Brewer explained 
in a speech at Yale Law School that “[p]roperty is as certainly de-
stroyed when the use of that which is the subject of property is taken 
away . . . for that which gives value to property, is its capacity for use.”99
Several years earlier, the New York Court of Appeals announced in In
re Jacobs that “[p]roperty . . . has no value unless it can be used.  Its ca-
pability for enjoyment and adaptability to some use are essential char-
acteristics and attributes without which property cannot be con-
ceived.”100  This was not dicta, as the Jacobs Court used this restatement 
of Lockean property theory to invalidate a regulation prohibiting ci-
gar manufacturing in tenement houses, concluding that the regula-
tion deprived the tenants of their constitutional due process rights.101
As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court similarly observed in 1823, “prop-
erty, without the power of use and disposition, is an empty sound.”102
95 James Madison, Property, NAT’L GAZETTE, Mar. 29, 1792, reprinted in JAMES MADI-
SON, WRITINGS 515 ( Jack N. Rakove ed., 1999). 
96 Id. at 515 (emphasis added). 
97 Id. at 517. 
98 See Laura S. Underkuffler, On Property:  An Essay, 100 YALE L.J. 127, 137 (1990) 
(“The broad conception of property found in Madison’s essay, and implicit in the writ-
ings of others in the Founding Era, is not an aberration in intellectual history.”); see 
also Mossoff, supra note 28, at 404-07 (same). 
99 D.J. Brewer, Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Protection of Private Property from 
Public Attack, Address at the Yale Law School Graduation Ceremony ( June 23, 1891), 
as reprinted in 10 GREEN BAG 2D 495, 501 (2007). 
100 In re Jacobs, 98 N.Y. 98, 105 (1885). 
101 Id. at 115. 
102 In re Flintham’s Appeal, 11 Serg. & Rawle 16, 23 (Pa. 1824) (Duncan, J.). 
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B. Lockean Property Theory and Intellectual Property 
As is clear from the previous Section, Lockean property theory was 
not a theoretical boogeyman invented by Felix Cohen and other legal 
realists to make their positivist conception of property seem reason-
able by comparison.  Throughout the nineteenth century, courts em-
ployed Lockean property theory to justify the protection of property 
rights, especially the new forms of intellectual property that were com-
ing into existence as a result of the Industrial Revolution.  For in-
stance, in 1868 in Peabody v. Norfolk, the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts became the first American court to hold that trade se-
crets should be protected as property.103  According to the Peabody
court, the reason for its decision was simply a matter of treating like 
cases alike: 
If a man establishes a business and makes it valuable by his skill and at-
tention, the good will of that business is recognized by the law as prop-
erty.  If he adopts and publicly uses a trade mark, he has a remedy, ei-
ther at law or in equity, against those who undertake to use it without his 
permission.
104
Since the valuable labor that created a trade secret was no differ-
ent in kind from the valuable labor that created good will or trade-
marks, there was no reason that the courts should not protect trade 
secrets as the property rights of their creators.  In 1984 in Ruckelshaus
v. Monsanto Co., the United States Supreme Court continued this long 
tradition of relying on Lockean property theory to justify the legal 
protection of trade secrets as property—explicitly citing John Locke 
for the proposition that property arises from “labour and inven-
tion.”105
The Monsanto Court’s reference to “invention” was not happen-
stance.  The Peabody court had similarly invoked patented inventions 
as exemplars of valuable property already secured under the law.106
Throughout the nineteenth century, courts often justified the protec-
tion of patents under the Lockean principle that the state should se-
cure to people the fruits of their labors; in patent cases, it was the 
103 98 Mass. 452, 458 (1868). 
104 Id. at 457. 
105 467 U.S. 986, 1003 (1984) (citing JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL 
GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 14-26 ( J.W. Gough ed., 1946) 
(1690)).
106 Peabody, 98 Mass. at 457-58. 
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fruits of inventive labors.107  Nineteenth-century courts similarly in-
voked Lockean property theory to justify protecting patents as consti-
tutional private property under the Takings Clause.108
It should be unsurprising, then, that one finds Chancellor James 
Kent, in his influential Commentaries on American Law, classifying both 
copyrights and patents as property obtained through “[o]riginal 
[a]cquisition by [i]ntellectual [l]abor.”109  Chancellor Kent observed 
that “[i]t is just that [authors and inventors] should enjoy the pecuni-
ary profits resulting from mental as well as bodily labor.”110  In 1824, 
Daniel Webster proposed a bill that would make it possible for foreign 
inventors to apply for United States patents, declaring in his floor 
speech in the House of Representatives: 
And, at this time of day, and before this Assembly, . . . he need not argue 
that the right of the inventor is a high property; it is the fruit of his 
mind—it belongs to him more than any other property—he does not 
inherit it—he takes it by no man’s gift—it peculiarly belongs to him, and 
he ought to be protected in the enjoyment of it.
111
Webster repeated this argument throughout his life.  It is notable 
that he explicitly invoked it in 1852 in his last court appearance, in 
which he successfully represented Charles Goodyear (the inventor of 
vulcanized rubber) in Goodyear’s patent infringement lawsuit against 
Horace Day.112  Webster won the day for Goodyear with an explicit ap-
peal to Lockean property theory to justify Goodyear’s patent rights, 
proclaiming that “[i]nvention, as a right of property, stands higher 
than inheritance or devise, because it is personal earning.  It is more like 
acquisitions by the original right of nature.  In all these there is an ef-
fort of mind as well as muscular strength.”113  In ruling in favor of 
107 See Adam Mossoff, Who Cares What Thomas Jefferson Thought About Patents?  Reevalu-
ating the Patent “Privilege” in Historical Context, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 953, 992-93 (2007). 
108 See Adam Mossoff, Patents as Constitutional Private Property:  The Historical Protec-
tion of Patents Under the Takings Clause, 87 B.U. L. REV. 689, 700-07 (2007). 
109 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 474 (O.W. Holmes, Jr. ed., 
12th ed., Little, Brown, and Co. 1873) (1826). 
110 Id.
111 41 ANNALS OF CONG. 934 (1824).  Even the congressmen who disagreed with 
Webster’s specific legislative proposal, such as Representative Buchanan, found com-
mon cause with Webster that the law should secure “the property which an inventor 
has in that which is the product of his own genius.”  Id. at 936. 
112 CHARLES SLACK, NOBLE OBSESSION: CHARLES GOODYEAR, THOMAS HANCOCK,
AND THE RACE TO UNLOCK THE GREATEST INDUSTRIAL SECRET OF THE NINETEENTH 
CENTURY 182-88 (2002). 
113 Argument in the Goodyear Rubber Case, in 15 THE WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF 
DANIEL WEBSTER 437, 438 (Edward Everett ed., 1903). 
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Goodyear, Circuit Justice Grier and District Judge Dickerson found 
Webster’s argument compelling because they and other jurists agreed 
with the Lockean principle that the patent laws secure an inventor’s 
right to “enjoy the fruits of his invention.”114  Beyond employing these 
positive aspects of the normative rhetoric of Lockean property theory, 
nineteenth-century courts also identified patent infringers as “pirates” 
who stole from inventors the valuable fruits of their labors—their 
profits.115
C. Value and Property:  Antecedents and Consequents 
All of this suggests that Felix Cohen and the legal realists were jus-
tified in thinking that they had to take down Lockean property theory 
in order to claim that their new nominalist-positivist conception of 
property won by default.  James Kent, Daniel Webster, and nine-
teenth-century courts all employed Lockean property theory to justify 
protecting intellectual property on the grounds that the law should 
secure preexisting valuable fruits of inventive labors.  Cohen’s claim 
that Lockean property theory is “viciously circular,” although illus-
trated with early-twentieth-century case law, applies with equal force to 
the nineteenth-century legislatures, lawyers, and courts who readily 
invoked Lockean property theory as well.116
114 Hawes v. Gage, 11 F. Cas. 867, 867 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1871) (No. 6237); see also
Birdsall v. McDonald, 3 F. Cas. 441, 444 (C.C.N.D. Ohio 1874) (No. 1434) (“Patent 
laws are founded on the policy of giving to [inventors] remuneration for the fruits, en-
joyed by others, of their labor and their genius.”); Middletown Tool Co. v. Judd, 17 F. 
Cas. 276, 278 (C.C.D. Conn. 1867) (No. 9536) (recognizing that the patent laws secure 
even “the fruit of a very small amount of inventive skill”); Clark Patent Steam & Fire 
Regulator Co. v. Copeland, 5 F. Cas. 987, 988 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1862) (No. 2866) (“Con-
gress has wisely provided by law that inventors shall exclusively enjoy, for a limited sea-
son, the fruits of their inventions.”); Davoll v. Brown, 7 F. Cas. 197, 199 (C.C.D. Mass. 
1845) (No. 3662) (explaining that the law “protect[s] intellectual property, the labors 
of the mind, productions and interests as much a man’s own, and as much the fruit of 
his honest industry, as the wheat he cultivates, or the flocks he rears”); Brooks v. Bick-
nell, 4 F. Cas. 247, 251 (C.C.D. Ohio 1843) (No. 1944) (stating that “a man should be 
secured in the fruits of his ingenuity and labor” and that “it seems difficult to draw a 
distinction between the fruits of mental and physical labor”); McKeever v. United 
States, 14 Ct. Cl. 396, 420 (1878) (quoting an unnamed constitutional commentator 
that the Copyright and Patent Clause in Article I, Section 8, secures to authors and in-
ventors “a natural right to the fruits of mental labor”). 
115 See Mossoff, supra note 107, at 993 n.193 (listing cases in which infringers are 
identified as “pirates”). 
116 See supra notes 69-77 and accompanying text (explaining Cohen’s view of 
Lockean theory as circular). 
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In particular, the Peabody court’s use of Lockean property theory 
to justify the protection of trade secrets—property owned only by 
commercial firms engaged in the manufacture and sale of products or 
services in the market—seems to buttress Cohen’s critique, not un-
dermine it.  Cohen could point out that a trade secret is valuable only 
because its owner may obtain an injunction from a court, which is 
what makes it possible for a trade secret owner to demand money 
from others for permission to use the information.  Without this 
threat of an injunction—a state sanction enforcing a right to exclude 
others from the information—no one would feel compelled to pay for 
a trade secret.  The result would be that a trade secret would be no 
more valuable than anything else that is denied exclusive protection 
by the state, such as the generic words that courts safeguard from the 
attempts by commercial firms to trademark.117
Yet the safe harbor for generic terms in trademark law highlights 
an important difference between trademarks and the information 
typically secured in trade secrets or patents.  In using trademark doc-
trine to argue that Lockean property theory is conceptually incoher-
ent, Cohen chose his doctrinal example well, as it does seem at first 
blush that it is only a court’s decision to protect a trademark as “prop-
erty” that makes the trademarked term economically valuable.  “Cola” 
is an unfettered word that is free to be used by all; but for a single 
court decision, though, it would have joined “Coke” as the valuable 
and exclusive property of the Coca-Cola Company.118  The same can 
be said for “brassiere,”119 but not “Wonderbra.”120  In 1999, a federal 
court held that “hog” was a freely usable generic term, rejecting 
Harley-Davidson’s attempt at claiming it as a trademark for its 
motorcycles.121  But for that court decision, the economic value of the 
word “hog” would have skyrocketed, as Harley-Davidson would have 
enforced its right to exclude others from using the term.  In denying 
Harley-Davidson’s claim to trademark protection for “hog,” the court 
effectively valued this word at a market price of zero. 
117 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 12:1 (4th ed. 2008) (discussing the rule that firms are prohibited from 
claiming trademark protection for generic terms). 
118 See Dixi-Cola Labs., Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 117 F.2d 352 (4th Cir. 1941). 
119 See Charles R. De Bevoise Co. v. H. & W. Co., 60 A. 407 (N.J. Ch. 1905). 
120 “Wonderbra” is a trademark owned by Canadelle Limited Partnership of 
Canada, a wholly owned subsidiary of HanesBrands Inc. 
121 Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. Grottanelli, 164 F.3d 806 (2d Cir. 1999). 
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The court decisions concerning “cola,” “brassiere,” and “hog” 
seem to exemplify Cohen’s argument against Lockean property 
theory:  the value in something is a consequent of a court’s decision to 
protect something as property, not an antecedent.  Accordingly, the 
only thing a court does in a property case is decide whether to grant a 
right to exclude—i.e., whether to provide a plaintiff with an injunctive 
remedy.  The court makes this decision on the basis of pragmatic 
policy concerns about the economic and social consequences of such 
a decision, not on the basis of any “transcendental” claims about 
preceding labor and its valuable “fruits.”  The value follows logically 
from the grant of the right to exclude according to Cohen, it does not 
exist before this exclusive grant. 
Cohen’s trademark example thus seems plausible (more on this 
later).122 The problem, however, is that his argument is not solely 
about trademarks, it is a general argument about the nature of 
property as such.  Trademarks are Cohen’s only example for his 
general theoretical argument that Lockean property theory is viciously 
circular in its justification for securing property rights under the law.  
In sum, Cohen views Lockean property theory as begging the question 
of whether to grant a right to exclude on the basis of the value in the 
presumptive property at issue.  It is not value, Cohen argues, that leads 
to property; it is a grant of the right to exclude that leads to value. 
Trade secrets and patented inventions, however, reveal the initial 
cracks in Cohen’s critique.  Although there are doctrinal differences 
between trade secrets and patents, this is a distinction without a 
difference for purposes of the analysis here.  The reason is that 
inventions, regardless of how they are legally protected, would be 
valuable even if there were no legal system that protected them.  In 
fact, the protection of inventions as property under the patent laws is 
a relatively modern phenomenon.  The Anglo-American patent 
system’s provenance reaches back only several hundred years, to 
Parliament’s enactment of the Statute of Monopolies in 1623.123
Before that, the first institutionalized legal protection of information 
is found in the exclusive privileges afforded to craft knowledge in the 
guild system of fifteenth-century Venice.124  Trade secret doctrine is of 
122 See infra Section II.D. 
123 See Adam Mossoff, Rethinking the Development of Patents:  An Intellectual History, 
1550–1800, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 1255, 1270-76 (2001). 
124 See Craig Allen Nard & Andrew P. Morriss, Constitutionalizing Patents:  From 
Venice to Philadelphia, 2 REV. L. & ECON. 223, 233-58 (2006). 
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even more recent vintage:  there was no American trade secret 
doctrine until the Peabody decision in 1868.125
Prior to the 1623 Statute of Monopolies, the federal statutes 
enacted under the Copyright and Patent Clause in the 1787 Federal 
Constitution, and the Peabody decision in 1868, there was no 
standardized institutional protection of property rights in new 
products or processes within the Anglo-American legal system, either 
as patented inventions or as trade secrets.  Yet new ideas and 
technologies were extremely valuable to many people throughout 
history before such express legal property protections were 
established.  The wheel, sailing ships, and plows, to name just a few 
early inventions, were valuable contributions to the progress of 
human civilization long before the legal innovations of the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries. 
Modern patent theory, as informed by law and economics, under-
stands and embraces this fact.  The economic analysis of patent law 
assumes as one of its basic foundational premises that an invention’s 
value preexists its legal classification as property in the patent system.  
Ironically, modern patent scholars do so by adopting Cohen’s func-
tionalist account in advancing a utilitarian justification for intellectual 
property.126  As such, patent scholars today are wont to point out that 
the patent system incentivizes inventive activity by preventing third 
parties from free-riding on an inventor’s labors in creating a new 
technology or product.127  The concept of free-riding presupposes that 
a value preexists this free-riding behavior; otherwise, a third party 
would not be interested in free-riding.  Thus, the policy problem is 
relatively straightforward:  inventors know that they will create a valu-
able invention and that people will exploit the “public good” aspect of 
the idea by copying it freely.  The patent system corrects this “market 
failure” by securing the exclusive rights of use and disposition in an 
125 See supra notes 103-104 and accompanying text.  To this day, England refuses to 
recognize trade secrets as property, protecting them instead under various contract 
and tort doctrines.  See generally ALLISON COLEMAN, THE LEGAL PROTECTION OF TRADE 
SECRETS 8-9 (1992). 
126 See, e.g., Dennis D. Crouch, The Patent Lottery:  Exploiting Behavioral Economics for 
the Common Good, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 141, 141 (2008) (“[O]ur patent system is 
built primarily on assumptions about how incentives operate.”). 
127 See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 18-20 (2003) (discussing how “the public-good character 
of intellectual property . . . can make it difficult to prevent misappropriation and to 
exclude free riders” and thus “[u]nless there is power to exclude, the incentive to 
create intellectual property in the first place may be impaired”). 
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invention.128  In this way, an inventor can prevent third parties from 
stealing the fruits of his inventive labors, as nineteenth-century courts 
so eloquently and succinctly phrased this policy concern.129
More important, a free rider is not necessarily motivated by com-
mercial profit in the marketplace.  Although patent infringement of-
ten entails such motivations, the problem of free-riding applies to all 
intellectual property.  In the copyright context, the typical problem is 
not that a third party wants to sell a book written by an author, but 
rather that people will want to read a book, given its value to them.  
Without the copyright system, people will pursue such aesthetic, cul-
tural, and other personal values without any qualms—copying the 
book and stealing the fruits of the labors of the author.  The problem, 
according to modern intellectual property theory, is that an author 
understands this beforehand, and thus an author will decide not to 
labor in writing a book in the first place. 
In this way, the concept of free-riding challenges Cohen’s argu-
ment that value is a consequent, and not an antecedent, of a decision 
to secure something as property.  In its typical formulation, free-riding 
entails deriving economic value from another’s efforts,130 which pre-
supposes economic value before a court’s decision in a lawsuit that of-
ficially gives “property rule” protection to one of the (future) entitle-
ment owners.  But as the copyright situation discussed above makes 
clear, free-riding entails the pursuit of noneconomic values as well.  
Law and economics scholars often quantify such “subjective values” as 
variables in their analyses of legal doctrine, such as accounting for the 
personal value in living in one’s family home.131  But these are at best 
rough proxies because such values are not truly fungible.  This point 
has long been understood in common law property doctrine, which 
consistently awards injunctions, such as specific performance in con-
veyances of real property, as a default remedy.132  Unsurprisingly, pat-
ents, and by implication, copyrights, have also long been deemed 
uniquely valuable to their owners, and thus specific performance is 
128 See Mossoff, supra note 50, at 349-60. 
129 See supra notes 114-115 and accompanying text. 
130 See Lloyd Cohen, Holdouts and Free Riders, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 351 (1991). 
131 See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Taking Eminent Domain Apart, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV.
957, 995-1002. 
132 See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 12.4, at 768 (3d ed. 1999) (“Only for 
land, which English courts regarded with particular esteem, was a general exception 
made [in remedies for breach of contract], on the ground that each parcel of land was 
‘unique’ so money damages were inadequate.”). 
2009] IP at the Birth of the Administrative State 2029
also a default remedy in legal disputes concerning conveyances of 
these intellectual property rights.133
This is not a knock-down argument, however, to which Felix 
Cohen would not have a response.  Cohen would remind us that he 
does not argue that value exists if and only if something is designated 
as property.  He identifies air, for example, as something that is 
extremely valuable and that is not designated as “property” under the 
law.134  In this respect, Cohen is not attacking a straw man in his 
critique of Lockean property theory.  He distinguishes between the 
concepts of property and value, recognizing that one does not 
necessarily lead to the other.  As Cohen rightly points out, “not only is 
there valueless property, but there is also propertyless value.”135
Yet if value is a consequence of designating something as prop-
erty, then how can Cohen account for such things as valueless prop-
erty?  If there is a grant of a right to exclude to an entitlement owner, 
then it seems that its value should always follow as a result, as the 
newly designated “property owner” will extract value by requiring oth-
ers to pay him for access.  Not so, Cohen would respond.  Although 
Cohen does not explicitly discuss this issue in his work on property, it 
is easy to see his answer to this question.  The question confuses a 
necessary condition with a sufficient condition.  Cohen argues that 
the creation of a right to exclude is a necessary condition for value to 
exist in property, such as a trademark, but it is not sufficient.  There 
must also be a market for the now exclusive thing—i.e., people who 
are willing to pay money to entice the property owner to relinquish his 
right to exclude.  If there is no market, such as in Cohen’s example of 
personal papers,136 then there is no value in the objects designated as 
property.
The same could be said of trademarks.  A term is only valuable as 
a trademark, even if its owner is granted a right to exclude, if it repre-
sents a successful product in the marketplace.  “Coke” is a valuable 
trademark today.  “Woolworth” is not.  Woolworth was once one of the 
largest retailers in the United States, but the company went bankrupt 
and shuttered all of its stores in 1997.  Thus, the designation of some-
133 See, e.g., Conway v. White, 9 F.2d 863, 866 (2d Cir. 1925) (“It is of course well-
settled law that a contract to sell or transfer a patented right, like a contract to sell real 
estate, may be specifically enforced.  The reason is that there is no accurate measure of 
damages, and a pecuniary payment is inadequate relief.”). 
134 Cohen, supra note 34, at 364. 
135 Id.
136 See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text. 
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thing as property is necessary for it to be valuable, but it is not suffi-
cient.  This logical insight is captured nicely in Cohen’s pithy remark 
that “property is not wealth.”137
Given Cohen’s responses to the critique of his claim that Lockean 
property theory is engaging in circular reasoning, it is evident that the 
problem is not in the logical form of his argument.  The issue of 
whether value, B, is a consequent of property, A, in a conditional 
proposition—stated in symbolic logic as A B, A,  B—is dependent 
on the specific sense that Cohen attributes to the variable 
representing “value,” B.  In other words, Cohen rightly believes that 
value is a consequent of a property designation because he defines 
this term in a specific way that logically compels him to this 
conclusion.  This is the topic of the next Section. 
D.  Value and Wealth:  Genus and Species 
Felix Cohen’s succinct summary of his analysis of the relationship 
between value and property—“property is not wealth”—reveals the 
fundamental error in his critique of Lockean property theory.  Of 
course, the philosophical analysis of “value” is a complex epistemo-
logical and ethical issue that has been debated for as long as philoso-
phy has existed in western civilization.138  A short section cannot do 
justice to the breadth and scope of the philosophical study of this sub-
ject, but such a comprehensive account is not necessary for the pur-
poses of this Article.  It is sufficient to identify the way in which 
Cohen’s critique of Lockean property theory falls short of its mark.  
Accordingly, it is necessary to explain only that Cohen uses “value” in 
a very narrow sense—as a synonym for wealth—and that this is not the 
same sense of this term as is used in Lockean property theory.  This 
Section will thus explicate these different conceptions of “value,” 
revealing how Cohen misused intellectual property in his critique of 
Lockean property theory. 
Cohen does not specifically define value, but his criticism of 
Lockean property theory for failing to account for the existence of 
both “valueless property” and “propertyless value” reveals his concep-
tual commitments.139  In this argument, he subtly shifts from using the 
137 Cohen, supra note 34, at 364. 
138 See, e.g., W.T. JONES, THE CLASSICAL MIND 153 (2d ed. 1970) (explaining that 
the goal of Plato’s moral philosophy was to “show that values are objective facts about 
the universe and that knowledge of them is possible”). 
139 See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text. 
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term “value” to his conclusion that “property is not wealth.”140  In 
other words, Cohen believes that “value” is synonymous with “wealth” 
(i.e., economic value).  This sense of “value” is implicit in his use of 
trademark doctrine, as he assumes that the value in the trademark is 
its economic value to its owner.  In fact, the value must be economic, 
because if there were no profit at stake, a commercial firm would not 
expend the money—the transaction costs, in economists’ parlance—
to obtain a court order that enforces its property right in a trademark. 
This observation that Cohen has a very narrow concept of value 
exposes a crucial mistake in his critique of Lockean property theory.  
Cohen assumes that his definition of value as “economic value” or 
“wealth” is the same definition used by Locke and his fellow natural-
rights philosophers, scholars, and jurists.  But this is a mistaken 
assumption, and it undermines his claim to have proven the inherent 
illogic of Lockean property theory, at least as an alternative to 
Cohen’s positivist conception of property as securing only a right to 
exclude. 
In their intellectual context, nineteenth-century courts and legis-
lators were not guilty of employing viciously circular rhetoric when 
they used Lockean property theory to justify legal protection of prop-
erty and intellectual property.  To the contrary, they were identifying 
that inventions produced through human ingenuity and labor, such as 
railroad-car airbrakes,141 vulcanized rubber,142 sewing machines,143 or 
incandescent lightbulbs,144 were valuable to human life regardless of 
whether they were mass produced and sold in a highly developed 
commercial economy.  They were valuable because they made both 
life and happiness possible, as the production of such goods is what 
makes it possible for humans to live and flourish.145
The nineteenth-century courts and legislators learned this point 
directly from Locke,146 whose “mixing labor” metaphor was an almost 
140 Cohen, supra note 34, at 364.
141 U.S. Patent No. 360,070 (filed Nov. 19, 1886) (issued Mar. 29, 1887). 
142 U.S. Patent No. 3,633 (issued June 15, 1844). 
143 U.S. Patent No. 4,750 (issued Sept. 10, 1846). 
144 U.S. Patent No. 223,898 (filed Nov. 4, 1878) (issued Jan. 27, 1880). 
145 The following four paragraphs are based on the author’s arguments in Locke’s
Labor Lost, supra note 91, at 159-61. 
146 The study of Locke and other natural law philosophers was fundamental to a 
legal education in the early American Republic.  See 1 DAVID HOFFMAN, A COURSE OF 
LEGAL STUDY 59-63 (2d ed. 1836) (identifying texts by Aristotle, Cicero, Seneca, 
Grotius, Puffendorf, Locke, and others as essential subjects of study in a legal educa-
tion); Louis D. Brandeis, The Harvard Law School, 1 GREEN BAG 10, 14 (1889) (discuss-
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poetic turn of phrase referring to the normative function of production
within Locke’s natural law moral philosophy.147  Throughout chapter 
five of the Second Treatise, when Locke gives illustrative examples of 
what mixing labor means in creating property, this metaphor repeat-
edly exemplifies productive activities.  Accordingly, mixing labor 
represents the acts of gathering nuts, growing vegetables and fruits, 
mining ore, killing a deer, catching fish, hunting a hare, cultivating 
land for farming, sewing clothes, baking bread, felling timber, and, 
last but certainly not least, fermenting wine.148  “Nature and the Earth 
furnished only the almost worthless Materials,” writes Locke, and it is 
these that “Industry . . . made use of” in creating all manner of items 
used by people.149
It is important to recognize that, for Locke, all of these productive 
activities occur in the state of nature—before the evolution of money 
and the creation of a commercial economy that values such products 
in terms of financial wealth.  In fact, Locke uses these examples of 
mixing labor in the Second Treatise to make a normative claim, not a 
political or economic claim, about the moral status of such activities.  
His point is that production is a moral activity, because the natural law 
requires that man be “bound to preserve himself, and not to quit his Sta-
tion wilfully.”150  According to Locke, each individual’s basic moral ob-
ligation is self-preservation, and, once this condition is met, to pre-
serve the rest of mankind as well.  If it is a moral obligation to preserve 
oneself, then it follows as a corollary that the means of this preserva-
tion is a moral virtue.  For mankind, the means of survival are 
produced goods, such as shelter, clothing, and food.  Labor is the 
means by which each individual fulfills his fundamental moral 
obligation because it is labor—production—that creates the products 
necessary for him to live. 
ing Justice Joseph Story’s appointment as a professor at Harvard Law School in 1829 to 
teach, among other subjects, a course in “The Law of Nature”), reprinted in 11 GREEN 
BAG 2D 483, 489-90 (2008); James Kent, A Lecture, Introductory to a Course of Law 
Lectures in Columbia College (Feb. 2, 1824), in THE LEGAL MIND IN AMERICA 92, 100-
01 (Perry Miller ed., 1962) (identifying “the learned Grotius,” as well as “Puffendorf, 
Barbeyrac, Bynkershoeck, Burlemaqui, Wolfius, Vattel, Heineccius, Montesquieu, 
Rutherforth, and Martens,” as the scholars whom law students should study in prepar-
ing for a career in the law (italics omitted)). 
147 See LOCKE, supra note 21, at 288 (“Whatsoever then he removes out of the State 
that Nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his Labour with, and joyned to 
it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his Property.”).
148 Id. at 286-91, 294-300. 
149 Id. at 298 (emphasis omitted). 
150 Id. at 271. 
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The conclusion that the mixing-labor metaphor is simply Locke 
taking poetic license in referring to production is not based only on 
an inference from the natural law framework of the Second Treatise.
Locke consistently used the term “labor” throughout his writings to 
refer to productive activities.  In a short essay written in 1693, aptly ti-
tled Labour, Locke uses this term to refer only to those productive ac-
tivities “[b]y which all mankind might be supplied with what the real 
necessities and conveniency of life demand.”151  Labor has a similar 
meaning in Locke’s writings on education.152
It is only after one has identified the production-based meaning of 
Locke’s mixing-labor metaphor within the context of his natural law 
ethics that it is possible to understand why Locke argues for the labor 
theory of value as an essential element of his theory of property.  And 
it is at this important juncture that Felix Cohen’s assumption that 
value means wealth leads Cohen astray in his critique.  Locke is ada-
mant in making the case “that of the Products of the Earth useful to 
the Life of Man 9/10 are the effects of labour,”153 which he demonstrates 
by pointing out the almost self-evident fact that the products of one 
acre of farmland, such as “Straw, Bran, Bread, [and] . . . Wheat,” are 
worth more than that same acre of land lying fallow.154  The sole dif-
ference in value between food and fallow land “is all the Effect of La-
bour.”155  As Locke explains, it is “Labour then which puts the greatest 
part of Value upon Land,” and “’tis to that we owe the greatest part of all 
its useful Products.”156  The labor that underlies the creation of prop-
erty is the same labor that creates valuable products, because mixing 
labor means production.157
151 JOHN LOCKE, Labour (1693), reprinted in POLITICAL ESSAYS 326, 328 (Mark 
Goldie ed., 1997). 
152 JOHN LOCKE, Of the Conduct of the Understanding, in SOME THOUGHTS 
CONCERNING EDUCATION AND OF THE CONDUCT OF THE UNDERSTANDING 163, 215 
(Ruth W. Grant & Nathan Tarcov eds., 1996); see also JOHN LOCKE, Some Thoughts 
Concerning Reading and Study for a Gentleman (1703), reprinted in SOME THOUGHTS 
CONCERNING EDUCATION AND OF THE CONDUCT OF THE UNDERSTANDING, supra, at 
348.153 LOCKE, supra note 21, at 296.
154 Id. at 298.
155 Id.
156 Id.
157 This also suggests that labor creates the conditions by which men can rise 
above subsistence-level living in the state of nature and thereby transcend the “enough 
and as good” proviso on original acquisition.  See, e.g., id. at 294 (“[H]e who 
appropriates land to himself by his labour, does not lessen but increase the common 
stock of mankind.”). 
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In this context, the act of mixing labor to produce new goods, 
which is necessary to satisfy the obligation of the natural law of self-
preservation, logically and temporally precedes the creation of a mar-
ket economy in which people engage in commercial transactions.  
Consistent with classical and early-seventeenth-century natural law 
philosophers,158 Locke explicitly recognizes that mixing labor (pro-
duction) occurs before commercial transactions; money is only an 
agreed-upon medium of exchange representing the value in items 
previously produced by an individual.159  As Locke deftly observes, 
“Gold and Silver . . . has its value only from the consent of Men, 
whereof Labour yet makes, in great part, the measure, it is plain . . . .”160
However, a person who has produced something, such as picking 
acorns and cooking them, may use this item without a market transac-
tion occurring at all.  A lone individual stranded on a desert island 
would engage in mixing labor to produce the wares necessary to live, 
such as creating food, clothing, and shelter, in the precise manner set 
forth in Lockean property theory.  According to Locke, this person 
has produced valuable products, which is exactly what the natural law 
would command him to do.  Value is defined here by reference to the 
requirements of self-preservation—what is required for this person to 
survive is of value to him.  In this context, there is no creation of 
wealth because there is no market in which this individual can trade 
his goods with other people using a medium of exchange.  In Lockean 
property theory, the market is a consequent of production—not an 
antecedent.
In critiquing Locke’s genetic argument for the descriptive and 
normative foundations of property—the act of production rooted in a 
basic moral duty to preserve oneself—Felix Cohen presupposes the 
existence of a complex industrial economy and an advanced legal sys-
tem.  He thus ends up using the same linguistic terms as does Locke, 
especially “value,” but he defines these terms differently from Locke 
158 See 1 HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE PRAEDAE COMMETARIUS [COMMENTARY ON THE 
LAW OF PRIZE AND BOOTY] 227-28 (Gwladys L. Williams & Walter H. Zeydel trans., Ox-
ford University Press 1950) (1604) (agreeing with Horace, Cicero, and Seneca that in 
the early stages of the state of nature “there were no commercial transactions”); see also
id. at 230 (“At a subsequent stage in the evolution of property, . . . commerce began to 
be widely practised.”). 
159 See LOCKE, supra note 21, at 300-01 (recognizing that, after producing the items 
necessary to live, “thus came in the use of Money, some lasting thing that Men might keep 
without spoiling, and that by mutual consent Men would take in exchange for the truly 
useful”).
160 Id. at 301-02. 
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and the American legal professionals who implemented Lockean 
property theory in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.  In defin-
ing value in terms of wealth in his critique of Lockean property the-
ory, which clearly uses a different sense of this term, Cohen’s argu-
ment falls flat.161
This discussion of Lockean property theory should not be miscon-
strued.  Locke’s concepts of labor and value are not the only ones that 
may be compared to Felix Cohen’s property theory, nor is Locke’s 
theory necessarily the best.  Locke’s property theory, though, is espe-
cially useful for two reasons, the first historical and the second con-
ceptual.  First, within the early years of the American Republic, 
Locke’s property theory was the best known property theory and the 
most influential in shaping American property law.162  American law-
yers and judges in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were well 
acquainted with Lockean property theory, or at least they were well ac-
quainted with the secondary sources that reflected its influences, such 
as William Blackstone’s Commentaries or Cato’s Letters.163  Accordingly, it is 
important to understand Lockean property theory in order to grasp the 
161 This is a rhetorical move that has a long pedigree in intellectual debate.  In 
fact, Locke has no grounds to complain, because he uses this technique in the First
Treatise against his own seventeenth-century antagonist, Robert Filmer, a proponent of 
the political theory of the divine right of kings.  See Peter Laslett, Introduction to LOCKE,
supra note 21, at 69 (“Not only did Locke refuse to meet Filmer on his own ground, 
and fail to recognize the full strength, antiquity and importance of the patriarchal tra-
dition, he persistently ignored the searching counter-criticisms which are the strength 
of Filmer’s case.” (footnote omitted)).
162 See JAMES L. HUSTON, SECURING THE FRUITS OF LABOR 17 (1998) (“[T]he 
American Revolution was virtually built on the labor theory of property/value.”); Un-
derkuffler, supra note 98, at 133-42 (discussing the substantial influence of Locke’s 
conception of property on early American property jurisprudence). 
163 See DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, Preface to the Beacon Press Edition of THE MYSTERIOUS 
SCIENCE OF THE LAW (Beacon Press 1958) (1941) (“In the history of American institu-
tions, no other book—except the Bible—has played so great a role as Blackstone’s 
Commentaries on the Laws of England.”); CLINTON ROSSITER, SEEDTIME OF THE REPUBLIC
141 (1953) (“No one can spend any time in the newspapers, library inventories, and 
pamphlets of colonial America without realizing that Cato’s Letters rather than Locke’s 
Civil Government was the most popular, quotable, esteemed source of political ideas in 
the colonial period.”).  The influence of Locke on Cato’s Letters is undeniable.  See
1 JOHN TRENCHARD & THOMAS GORDON, CATO’S LETTERS 427 (Ronald Hamowy ed., 
1995) (Letter No. 62, Jan. 20, 1721) (“By liberty, I understand the power which every 
man has over his own actions, and his right to enjoy the fruit of his labour, art, and in-
dustry . . . . And thus . . . every man is sole lord and arbiter of his own private actions 
and property.”).  The same is true of Blackstone.  See generally 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *1-115 (citing Grotius, Pufendorf, and Locke repeatedly in discussing 
how natural rights, including property, arise in the state of nature and how society is 
formed to secure these rights). 
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intellectual context in which the Peabody Court, Daniel Webster, and 
other nineteenth-century legal professionals repeatedly claimed that 
the law should secure to inventors the “fruits of their labors.”164
Second, Lockean property theory, because it is so well known, 
serves ideally to explain the important conceptual distinction between 
value and wealth that is elided by Cohen.  Economic value is only one 
species of value; it is the value of an item or service as quantified in a 
market according to an agreed-upon medium of exchange.  This is 
not the only type of value.  In terms of Locke’s moral philosophy, at 
least in the basic framework that he sets forth in the Second Treatise,
Locke defines value as something that serves the requirements of hu-
man life as required by the natural law.  One can easily find other 
senses of value, such as in the recent work of Judge Richard Posner.  
Judge Posner originally agreed with Cohen that value meant wealth, as 
Posner once famously argued that wealth maximization was the only 
appropriate normative metric in legal analysis.165  By the 1990s, how-
ever, Judge Posner abandoned this claim, developing a more general 
pragmatic theory of law166 that recognizes that there are values in po-
litical and legal institutions beyond simply counting dollars.167  There 
are even more general definitions of value, such as Ayn Rand’s defini-
tion of this concept in her metaethics as “that which one acts to gain 
and/or keep.”168  As philosopher Tara Smith has explained, Rand 
concludes that it is when one chooses to obtain and keep values in ac-
cord with human nature that values become moral values.169  More-
over, similar to Locke’s explanation of the evolution of money, Rand 
164 See supra note 114 and accompanying text. 
165 See generally Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J.
LEGAL STUD. 103 (1979). 
166 See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 11 (1995) (defining his 
pragmatic theory of law as “practical, instrumental, forward-looking, activist, empirical, 
skeptical, antidogmatic, [and] experimental”). 
167 See Richard A. Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 14-15 
(1996) (discussing myriad normative questions raised by a life sentence of a sixteen-
year-old for the sale of a single marijuana cigarette); see also Martha Minow, Religion 
and the Burden of Proof:  Posner’s Economics and Pragmatism in Metzl v. Leininger, 120 
HARV. L. REV. 1175, 1176-79 (2007) (describing the “overlap” in the domains of prag-
matism and economics, and how the latter now serves the former in Posner’s mature 
theory of adjudication). 
168 AYN RAND, The Objectivist Ethics, in THE VIRTUE OF SELFISHNESS 13, 15 (1964). 
169 See TARA SMITH, VIABLE VALUES ch. 4 (2000). 
2009] IP at the Birth of the Administrative State 2037
predicates economic value on the existence of previously produced 
valuable goods.170
Simply put, the normative concept of “value” is broader than the 
economic concept of value (wealth).  In critiquing Lockean property 
theory as “viciously circular,” Cohen is conflating this distinction be-
tween a genus and one of its species; in this case, it is the distinction 
between value and specific types of value, such as moral value, per-
sonal value, aesthetic value, economic value, or others.  Cohen would 
have us count dollars as the only conceivable measure of value in 
property theory.  This is exactly what Cohen means when he says that 
the value in a trademark necessarily follows from a court’s decision to 
enforce the trademark as a property right by granting to its designated 
owner the right to exclude others—an injunction.171  As a result, 
Cohen hastily dismisses Lockean property theory on the grounds that 
“property is not wealth,”172 because it is only possible for wealth to be 
generated after a state’s creation of a property right in a citizen. 
In holding Lockean property theory accountable to this material-
istic conception of value as wealth, Cohen ironically commits the same 
metaphysical mistake of which he accuses earlier theories of property.  
In short, Cohen assumes the “thingification” of value.173  In Cohen’s 
sense, values are only discernable things—dollars.  Thus, there is “val-
ueless property,” such as personal papers, because no one is willing to 
pay for them, just as there is “propertyless value,” such as air, because 
people are willing to pay for clean air (through taxes or other legal or 
market mechanisms).  It is surprising that Cohen assumes the “thingi-
fication” of value in a scathing critique of Lockean property theory for 
its alleged “thingification” of property. 
This does not mean that Cohen is incorrect that there is value, 
even economic value, arising from the state’s official legal classifica-
tion of something as “property.”  As a result of this formal legal decla-
ration, a property owner will receive the protection of a state’s legal 
institutions, such as police and the courts.  This leads to the benefits 
of a legal system that clearly defines property rights and respects the 
rule of law in enforcing these rights:  certainty and determinacy.  This 
170 See Ayn Rand, What is Capitalism?, in CAPITALISM: THE UNKNOWN IDEAL 11, 26 
(1967) (“The economic value of a man’s work is determined, on a free market, by a 
single principle:  by the voluntary consent of those who are willing to trade him their 
work or products in return.”). 
171 See supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text. 
172 See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text. 
173 See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
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breeds predictability, and predictability breeds stability, and stability 
in legal entitlements fosters well-functioning markets, which produce 
more wealth, which leads to the evolution of more diffuse types of 
property, such as industrial plants, airplanes, trade secrets, and pat-
ented biotech inventions.  In fact, Locke agrees with Cohen on this 
point, as the lack of certainty in the state of nature concerning the se-
curity of one’s life and possessions is one of the precipitating factors 
for people to quit their “Executive Power” and to create a civil society 
and government.174  Even more important for Locke, the protection of 
property rights in civil society makes a market system of exchange pos-
sible.175  On this issue—the economic benefits directly flowing from 
the express classification of something as “property” within a formal 
legal system—Cohen and Locke are on common ground. 
Cohen’s mistake, though, in conflating wealth with value leads 
him ultimately to conflate the effective certainty in property rights 
achieved through their legal protection with the existence of property 
rights as such.  Yet property exists in many different contexts in which 
such complete legal and economic certainty does not, and may never, 
exist.  A commodities market is probably the most sophisticated ex-
ample in which uncertainty in the future existence of property is 
priced through a market mechanism.  This is admittedly not a com-
pelling counterexample, because a modern commodities market ex-
ists within a background framework of property and contract law.  But 
there are also numerous examples of property existing outside of any 
formal legal system, such as the famous lobster gangs of Maine, which 
developed their own property system given the government’s refusal 
to apply legal property concepts to the ocean.176  There are also the 
equally famous Shasta County cattle ranchers in Northern California, 
who chose to “opt out” of the formal legal system by creating their 
own property norms among members of their community.177  Lastly, 
there are the numerous black markets that have existed throughout 
human history in which exchanges of products have occurred in the 
absence of any formal legal right to exclude and, in the case of the 
174 LOCKE, supra note 21, at 325 (emphasis omitted). 
175 See id. at 301 (observing that the creation of large cattle ranches in America 
would not occur “where [one] had no hopes of Commerce with other Parts of the 
World, to draw Money to him by the Sale of the Product”). 
176 See generally JAMES M. ACHESON, THE LOBSTER GANGS OF MAINE (1988). 
177 See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE 
DISPUTES (1991). 
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former communist states in Eastern Europe, where there were express 
legal pronouncements to the contrary. 
In all of these circumstances, individuals are creating, transfer-
ring, and using valuable products or services.  The value in these 
products or services exists without any official grant of a right to ex-
clude, and sometimes in the face of contrary legal pronouncements, 
such as in the communist-era black markets.  If one is uncomfortable 
with the metaethical analysis of Locke or other philosophers, then the 
objective existence of products or services that are produced by peo-
ple, either for personal consumption or for trade in non–legally sanc-
tioned exchanges, is empirical evidence that value is not synonymous 
with wealth.  It further confirms the closely related error in confusing 
the effective certainty provided by an official legal enforcement of a 
property right, which then generates further wealth-maximizing uses 
of this property, with the existence of the value itself. 
In sum, Cohen misused intellectual property in critiquing 
Lockean property theory.  Although not attacking a straw man per se, 
Cohen’s influential scholarship did not address the actual property 
theory developed by Locke and his fellow natural rights philosophers.  
Cohen used patents and copyrights to ground his conceptual claim 
that all property rights are defined by a right to exclude granted by 
the state, and he further used trademarks to paint a picture of 
Lockean property theory as “viciously circular.”178  In both instances, 
there was a surprising dearth of actual substantive argument for his 
conceptual and jurisprudential claims.  Notably, Locke and his heirs 
in American property and intellectual property law did not share with 
Cohen this narrow definition of value as wealth.  In advancing his “re-
alistic definition of private property,”179 Cohen fired a tremendous 
broadside at Lockean property theory, and missed. 
It would be an error, though, to repeat the legal realists’ assump-
tion that a theoretical position wins by default on the grounds that an 
alternative theory has been shown to be inadequate or incoherent.  
The preceding philosophical analysis does not establish the soundness 
of Lockean property theory as it applies to real property or intellec-
tual property, but rather it identifies only how Felix Cohen’s critique 
failed to hit its mark.  There may be a valid justification for the nomi-
nalist-positivist conception of property that lies outside the work of 
Cohen and the legal realists, but that is beyond the scope of our pre-
178 See supra notes 69-76 and accompanying text. 
179 See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text. 
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sent inquiry.  The point here is simply that the legal realists did not 
succeed in proving that Lockean property theory was inadequate or 
incoherent.  This intellectual history serves as an important cautionary 
tale for modern intellectual property scholars seeking to build upon 
the work of the Progressives and legal realists within the twenty-first-
century administrative state. 
III. PROGRESSIVISM, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY,
AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
Lawyers engaged in twenty-first-century legal battles over the doc-
trinal requirements of patent protection or the institutional status of 
the PTO within the administrative state may find such philosophical 
disputation to be excessively airy and indeterminate.  This may be 
true, but, as shown above, some of these modern legal disputes, as well 
as the utilitarian and functionalist policies brought to bear in these le-
gal contests, were born of these same philosophical arguments.  
Within modern intellectual property scholarship, court briefs, and leg-
islative committee reports, one can hear the echoes of the legal real-
ists’ call for a purely functionalist account of legal entitlements serving 
regulatory goals. 
Lawyers and legal scholars seem unable to hear these theoretical 
resonances today.  Perhaps this is due to the fact that the Progressives 
and legal realists succeeded in their political and legal efforts, and we 
now live and work within an administrative state that regulates both 
tangible and intangible property rights.  Thus, almost a century after 
the Progressive Era, legal professionals simply accept the administra-
tive state and its corresponding political and legal artifacts as basic 
and undeniable facts of modern American political life.180  This may 
explain why modern property scholars have never reviewed or ana-
lyzed the exact premises and reasoning used by the legal realists to ef-
fect their revolution in property theory.  Even in my own past scholar-
ship, it has seemed sufficient merely to note the shift in political and 
legal theory in the Progressive Era and then move on to other theo-
retical or doctrinal concerns.181
180 But see Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L.
REV. 1231, 1231 (1994) (“The post–New Deal administrative state is unconstitutional, 
and its validation by the legal system amounts to nothing less than a bloodless constitu-
tional revolution.” (footnote omitted)). 
181 See, e.g., Mossoff, supra note 108, at 711-24. 
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Yet the use and abuse of intellectual property by the legal realists 
at the birth of the administrative state should not be studied by only 
legal historians or philosophers.  There are at least two reasons why 
this topic should be of interest to lawyers and legal scholars today.  
First, scholars working to integrate the patent system within the legal 
and institutional framework of the administrative state are not writing 
on a blank slate.  To the extent that Arti Rai argues that the PTO 
should be treated more on par with other administrative agencies creat-
ing and enforcing federal regulations,182 or that Shubha Ghosh believes 
that patent law writ large is simply a species of federal regulatory pol-
icy,183 the legal realists foreshadowed their scholarship in many respects. 
In fact, Felix Cohen did not simply critique Lockean property 
theory as illogical and conceptually incoherent.  Ultimately, Cohen 
argued that a court decision invoking Lockean property theory “is 
simply economic prejudice masquerading in the cloak of legal 
logic.”184  This followed from Cohen’s belief that, in granting a right to 
exclude to the creator of a trademark, courts are creating wealth by 
granting coercive power to one citizen (the trademark owner) to ex-
clude his fellow citizens from something in society (via a court injunc-
tion).  After a court decision upholding a trademark as property, if 
the trademark owner’s fellow citizens wish to use the mark, then they 
can do so only with the owner’s permission, which is now backed by 
the coercive power of the state.185  This permission is usually forthcom-
ing—at a price. 
In enforcing trademarks as property rights, Cohen concluded that 
courts are using Lockean property theory and its “viciously circular” 
premise about preexisting value to mask that their decisions “create 
182 See Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy:  A Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent 
System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 1075 (2003) (“A policy of deference to PTO 
fact finding in the context of patent denials may also discipline any institutional ten-
dency that the Federal Circuit has towards pro-patent bias.”).  To be fair, Professor Rai 
highlights some policy concerns with treating the PTO exactly on par with other ad-
ministrative agencies, see id. at 1132-33, but her criticisms here are entirely contingent 
insofar as they are based on the PTO’s current institutional structure.  Thus, for in-
stance, her concern that the PTO has not hired any economists to assist it with cost-
benefit analysis of its rule changes, see id. at 1133, can be addressed with appropriate 
legislation from Congress. 
183 See Ghosh, supra note 3, at 1388 (“Just as securities regulation is designed to 
promote investment in securities markets, so too should regulatory patent law . . . be 
designed to promote trust in the process of innovation in new technologies.”). 
184 Cohen, supra note 55, at 817. 
185 See generally Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive 
State, 38 POL. SCI. Q. 470 (1923). 
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and distribute a new source of economic wealth or power.”186  The 
trademark owner’s coercive power to exclude others did not preexist a 
court’s determining that the trademark is “property” and then order-
ing an injunction.  If a court then justifies the economic value result-
ing from this right to exclude—the wealth and power now wielded by 
the trademark owner—as a reason for defining the entitlement as 
property in the first place, the reasoning is truly circular.  Identifying 
this descriptive fact was only part of their project, as the legal realists 
also identified the normative function of this circularity:  it rational-
ized creating sovereign power in corporations and other commercial 
interests, who then profit by the permission they charge to laborers 
and consumers for relinquishing their right to exclude.187
Although Felix Cohen and his fellow legal realists were primarily 
concerned with the social and economic impact of the new capital 
and labor markets arising from the Industrial Revolution, their policy 
arguments foretold the twenty-first-century battle over intellectual 
property.  One merely needs to replace the Progressives’ and legal re-
alists’ policy concerns about “wealth” and “economic prejudice” with 
modern intellectual property scholars’ policy concerns about “innova-
tion” and “culture,” and one finds striking parallels in the respective 
policy arguments.  For instance, when Professor Rai criticizes the Fed-
eral Circuit’s formalist jurisprudence, arguing that “the Federal Cir-
cuit’s decisionmaking reflects not so much simple formalism as a pol-
icy of high patent protection masquerading as formalism,”188 one 
hears the clear echoes of Cohen’s criticism of traditional trademark 
doctrine as “simpl[e] economic prejudice masquerading in the cloak 
of legal logic.”189
Furthermore, some of the political or institutional goals of the 
early-twentieth-century legal realists and early-twenty-first-century in-
186 Cohen, supra note 55, at 816. 
187 See Cohen, supra note 43, at 12 (“The character of property as sovereign power 
compelling service and obedience may be obscured for us in a commercial economy 
by the fiction of the so-called labor contract as a free bargain and by the frequency 
with which service is rendered indirectly through a money payment.”); Hamilton, supra
note 53, at 877 (“The coming of industrialism left its impact upon the words of Locke.  
It separated the laborer from the instruments of production, articulated establish-
ments into an industrial system, and enabled a capitalistic ownership to come into the 
repute of a personalized property. . . .  [T]he property of the Reports is not a proprie-
tary thing; it is rather a shibboleth in whose name the domain of business enterprise 
has enjoyed a limited immunity from the supervision of the state.”). 
188 Rai, supra note 182, at 1110. 
189 Cohen, supra note 55, at 817. 
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tellectual property scholars parallel each other in striking ways.  The 
arguments of Felix Cohen and other legal realists concerning the 
definition and jurisprudential foundation of property were offered in 
service of the Progressives in crafting the modern administrative state.  
As then-former President Theodore Roosevelt famously proclaimed in 
his 1910 speech, The New Nationalism, “every man holds his property 
subject to the general right of the community to regulate its use to 
whatever degree the public welfare may require it,” which included, 
among other things, “the right to regulate the terms and conditions of 
labor, which is the chief element of wealth, directly in the interest of 
the common good.”190  In 1910, such a proclamation was anything but 
settled political or legal doctrine,191 contrary to Roosevelt’s assertion 
that “[t]he right to regulate the use of wealth in the public interest is 
universally admitted.”192  Thus, Roosevelt concluded his speech with a 
rousing call for action:  “The prime problem of our nation is to get 
the right type of good citizenship, and, to get it, we must have pro-
gress, and our public men must be genuinely progressive.”193  The sub-
sequent theoretical work in both property and constitutional law pro-
vided the justification for implementing such “genuinely progressive” 
measures. 
Many scholars and historians of the administrative state focus on 
the big constitutional law issues, such as the nondelegation doctrine,194
190 Theodore Roosevelt, The New Nationalism, Speech Delivered in Osawatomie, 
Kansas (Aug. 31, 1910), in THEODORE ROOSEVELT, AN AMERICAN MIND 139, 146 
(Mario R. DiNunzio ed., 1994). 
191 See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (invalidating labor regulation 
in the baking industry). 
192 Roosevelt, supra note 190, at 146. 
193 Id. at 149; see also Cohen, supra note 43, at 30 (asserting that “we need a certain 
liberal insight into the more intangible desires of the human heart” in order to “pro-
mote a better communal life”). 
194 Compare Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 332 
(2002) (“Sophisticated academics can decry the naivety of a bench, bar, and public 
that stubbornly cling to a model that legal events have long since left behind, but to 
abandon openly the nondelegation doctrine is to abandon openly a substantial portion 
of the foundation of American representative government.”), with Cass R. Sunstein, 
Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 494 (1987) (“A general re-
vival of the nondelegation doctrine would also be a mistake in light of a range of con-
siderations:  good reasons support the delegation of discretion, standards can be ex-
trapolated from seemingly vague statutes, judicial administration of a nondelegation 
principle would be both difficult and intrusive, and surrogate safeguards are available.” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
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and it often seems that property law issues receive short shrift.195  But 
the property issues have been just as important.  When municipalities 
began to introduce zoning regulations in the 1920s, for instance, they 
sometimes met resistance from landowners and other interest groups.  
This occurred in New Haven, Connecticut, and, as one historical study 
reports, 
over time, local advocates of urban planning, armed with theories of the 
“City Beautiful” movement, . . . came to dominate the discussion of land 
use controls, and the actual conditions of the city became increasingly 
irrelevant.  Outside consultants educated residents on the theoretical supe-
riority of zoned to unzoned land use, and in 1924 the mayor chided his 
fellow citizens for failing to adopt the progressive policies already enacted 
by more enlightened neighbors.196
As a result, the study notes that “[i]n 1926, despite the presence of 
sophisticated patterns of coordinated land use, New Haven passed its 
first zoning ordinance.”197  The theoretical arguments helped democ-
ratically accountable political elites make the case for adopting a regu-
latory regime for controlling the use and disposition of land.  Within a 
few decades of President Roosevelt’s call for more “genuinely progres-
sive” policies, the basic structure of the modern administrative state 
had been erected, with the help of legal scholars and lawyers doing 
work in both constitutional and property law. 
Similarly, in response to the vast technological and legal changes 
that have wrought hard-fought policy debates in recent years in copy-
right and patent law, some intellectual property scholars have sought 
to reframe intellectual property entitlements into more explicit regu-
latory terms.  Siva Vaidhyanathan has proclaimed that “[c]opyright 
should be about policy, not property,”198 and Tom Bell has explicitly 
195 In modern scholarship, one oft-cited text discussing the intersection of prop-
erty and constitutional law is Bruce Ackerman’s Private Property and the Constitution, su-
pra note 25, but its omnipresence in law journal footnotes is a testament to its status as 
one of the few monographs on this topic.  Since its publication, a few more scholars 
have addressed the topic and have engaged Professor Ackerman.  See generally JAMES W.
ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF 
PROPERTY RIGHTS (3d ed. 2008); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SUPREME NEGLECT: HOW TO 
REVIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION FOR PRIVATE PROPERTY (2008); RICHARD A. EP-
STEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985). 
196 Andrew J. Cappel, Note, A Walk Along Willow:  Patterns of Land Use Coordination 
in Pre-Zoning New Haven (1870–1926), 101 YALE L.J. 617, 635 (1991) (emphases added) 
(footnotes omitted). 
197 Id. at 634. 
198 SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, COPYRIGHTS AND COPYWRONGS: THE RISE OF INTELLEC-
TUAL PROPERTY AND HOW IT THREATENS CREATIVITY 15 (2001).  He has argued else-
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characterized copyright as welfare for authors.199  The institutional 
implications of such theoretical moves are fairly straightforward, as 
best exemplified in Pamela Samuelson’s call for a “New Deal” in copy-
right.200  Mark Lemley has also argued that “treating intellectual prop-
erty as a form of government subsidy is more likely to get people to 
understand the tradeoffs involved than treating it as real property.”201
In converting such ideas into practical, real-world terms, Stuart Ben-
jamin and Arti Rai have recently proposed that the federal govern-
ment institute a “centralized innovation regulator” whose authority 
would extend over all federal intellectual property doctrines and re-
lated legal fields affecting innovation, such as environmental policy.202
Further illustrating the institutional implications of their theoretical 
work, Professors Lemley, Rai, and other scholars joined as amici in 
support of the PTO’s successful claim to Chevron deference in Tafas v. 
Doll.203
Given these striking parallels in both policy arguments and institu-
tional goals, it may be fair to identify these intellectual property schol-
ars as twenty-first-century Progressives, replicating in our new high-
tech world the arguments of the early-twentieth-century legal realists 
who promoted the Progressive political agenda.  This is not a criti-
cism.  Whether Progressivism and legal realism are normatively ap-
pealing is a subject well beyond the scope of this Article.  The point 
here is solely a descriptive identification:  there is a deep intellectual 
history to the modern scholars proposing that intellectual property 
doctrines be reframed—theoretically, institutionally, and doctrinally—
into a regulatory policy framework.  It is only possible to identify this in-
where that “[c]opyright is not about ‘property’ as commonly understood.  It is a spe-
cific state-granted monopoly issued for particular policy reasons.”  Siva Vaidhyanathan, 
Copyright as Cudgel, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Aug. 2, 2002, at B7, B9, available at
http://chronicle.com/free/v48/i47/47b00701.htm. 
199 See Tom W. Bell, Authors’ Welfare:  Copyright as a Statutory Mechanism for Redistrib-
uting Rights, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 229 (2003). 
200 See Pamela Samuelson, Toward a “New Deal” for Copyright in the Information Age,
100 MICH. L. REV. 1488 (2002) (book review). 
201 Mark Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 
1032 (2005). 
202 See Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Fixing Innovation Policy:  A Structural 
Perspective, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 105-07), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1259850. 
203 See Brief for Intellectual Property, Administrative Law, and Public Health Pro-
fessors as Amici Curiae Supporting Defendants at 2-4, Tafas v. Dudas, 541 F. Supp. 2d 
805 (E.D. Va. 2008) (No. 07-0846), rev’d sub nom. Tafas v. Doll, No. 08-1352, 2009 WL 
723353 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 20, 2009). 
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tellectual history, though, if one recognizes the central role of intellec-
tual property in the legal realists’ theoretical work on property in land. 
This identification also highlights some concerns in legal-realist 
property theory underlying the administrative state, which leads to the 
second reason that this intellectual history is important and relevant 
to today’s legal disputes.  Felix Cohen’s failure to respond directly to 
Lockean property theory on its own terms left a substantial gap in the 
theoretical support of the administrative state.  His critique of 
Lockean property theory constituted the substance of Cohen’s justifi-
cation for his positivist claim that property is a right to exclude 
granted by the state.204  Of course, this does not mean that Lockean 
property theory wins by default, which would simply repeat the mis-
taken premise in the work of Cohen and the other legal realists.  
Moreover, it is tantamount to tilting at windmills to suggest that this is 
a sufficient reason by itself to question the continued existence of the 
administrative state.  These are certainly not the lessons offered here. 
This exposé of the failure of legal-realist property scholarship in 
service of the administrative state simply portends some cautionary 
tales for modern scholars advancing similar regulatory theories or in-
stitutional models of intellectual property.  As a preliminary matter, 
intellectual property scholars should be careful not to assume uncriti-
cally that the theoretical foundations of the administrative state are 
solid enough to serve as an Archimedean point from which they may 
shift intellectual property doctrines toward a regulatory entitlement 
model.  To do so would risk bootstrapping policy arguments from mis-
taken conventional wisdom about the success of legal-realist property 
scholarship.
More important, intellectual property scholars should be careful 
in using this conventional wisdom, because its mistaken provenance 
has spawned surprisingly procrustean characterizations of Lockean 
property theory within modern academic scholarship.  This has oc-
curred in modern philosophical treatments of Lockean property the-
ory, such as in Robert Nozick’s and Jeremy Waldron’s misplaced lin-
guistic critique of Locke’s mixing-labor metaphor.205  It has also 
seeped into property scholarship, which often repeats the post–legal 
realist conventional wisdom that Lockean property theory was phi-
204 See supra Section II.B. 
205 See Mossoff, supra note 91, at 156-63 (discussing Waldron’s and Nozick’s mis-
understanding of Locke’s property theory). 
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losophically formalistic and legally indeterminate.206  Lastly, it has in-
fluenced some modern intellectual property scholarship, which has 
advanced the surprising claim that intellectual property rights are, at 
best, statutory exemptions from Lockean property theory, or, at worst, 
incompatible with it.207  The echoes of legal-realist property theory are 
heard not just in the substantive content of modern policy arguments, 
but also in the very ways in which modern scholars structure their ar-
guments and frame their descriptive and conceptual priors. 
As discussed in Part II, it was neither an accident nor simply a mat-
ter of rhetoric in the service of rent-seeking interest groups that nine-
teenth-century courts and legislatures found Lockean property theory 
to be an appropriate theoretical framework to explain and justify in-
tellectual property rights.  But to recognize why this was the case and 
how this “conversion” from theory to practice occurred,208 one has to do 
so from within their intellectual context.  All too often, our modern 
utilitarian-positivist context precludes us from grasping the basic nor-
mative and legal concepts that nineteenth-century legal scholars and 
jurists took for granted, given their shared natural rights premises.209
206 See, e.g., Gregory S. Alexander, Commentary, The Ambiguous Work of “Natural 
Property Rights,” 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 477, 478-81 (2007) (restating the postrealist cri-
tique of natural property rights theory as “indeterminate” and “ambiguous”); Abraham 
Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Reconfiguring Property in Three Dimensions, 75 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1015, 1023 (2008) (asserting that in legal doctrine, “the surface attractiveness of 
the Blackstonian ideal breaks down” as the conception of property, because “providing 
a single owner with absolute dominion over a thing often proves unreachable, leaving 
owners and the policymakers the challenge of maximizing property value”); Amnon 
Lehavi, Mixing Property, 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 137, 211 (2008) (“As Carol Rose has 
demonstrated, even William Blackstone’s famous depiction of private property as en-
dowing absolute rights was more wishful thinking than a depiction of the doctrinal re-
ality of his time—an anxiety-relieving rhetoric of clarity uttered against a complex 
background of overlapping interests and mixed societal values.”).
207 See Liam Séamus O’Melinn, Software and Shovels:  How the Intellectual Property 
Revolution is Undermining Traditional Concepts of Property, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 143, 148 
(2007) (claiming that “Locke’s theory does not accord with either copyright or patent 
law”); cf. Tom W. Bell, Indelicate Imbalancing in Copyright and Patent Law, in COPY 
FIGHTS: THE FUTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 1, 4 
(Adam Thierer & Clyde Wayne Crews Jr. eds., 2002) (“More pointedly, copyright and 
patent protection contradicts Locke’s justification of property.”). 
208 See Hamilton, supra note 53, at 875 (foreshadowing modern criticism of 
Lockean property theory for being indeterminate given that “[t]he conversion of the 
prophetic narrative of a neocanonist into a chronicle of the emergence of a legal insti-
tution is no automatic task”). 
209 See, e.g., Mossoff, supra note 107, at 967-76 (identifying modern scholars’ mis-
understanding of the natural rights term of art “privilege” as it was used in antiquarian 
legal texts). 
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This problem is even more pressing because it goes beyond un-
derstanding basic concepts in historical texts that are situated within a 
bygone intellectual context, such as “labor” or “value.”  Scholars have 
even mischaracterized John Locke’s property theory when it is directly 
accessible to modern readers.  Contrary to claims by modern scholars 
that Locke did not endorse intellectual property,210 Locke explicitly 
recognized that his property theory justified intellectual property.  
Toward the end of chapter five of the Second Treatise, Locke identifies 
“Inventions and Arts” as labors that “had improved the conveniences 
of Life” and that exemplified his insight that “Man (by being the Mas-
ter of himself, and Proprietor of his own Person, and the Actions of La-
bour of it) had still in himself the great Foundation of Property.”211  More-
over, Locke explicitly endorsed copyright as the “property” of 
authors,212 and he even proposed an amendment to the Bill for Regulat-
ing Printing, proposed in Parliament in 1695, in order “[t]o secure the 
author’s property in his copy, or his to whom he has transferred it.”213
Such words make clear the direct lineage between Lockean prop-
erty theory and nineteenth-century American jurisprudence justifying 
patents, copyrights, and other forms of intellectual property as the 
rightful property of their creators.214  This intellectual history can no 
longer be dismissed as having been effectively repudiated by the legal 
realists.  This is particularly pressing when intellectual property schol-
ars presume this conventional wisdom in advancing the new twenty-
first-century functionalist account of legal entitlements—intellectual 
property rights as regulatory entitlements. 
210 See, e.g., RONAN DEAZLEY, RETHINKING COPYRIGHT 144 n.32 (2006) (“Locke 
himself did not consider his theory of property extended to intellectual properties 
such as copyrights and patents.”); Lior Zemer, The Making of a New Copyright Lockean, 29 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 891, 894 (2006) (describing how copyright scholars “claim that 
Locke does not, either in the Two Treatises or elsewhere, address the issues of the intel-
lectual commons, intellectual property in general, or copyright in particular”). 
211 LOCKE, supra note 21, at 298-99. 
212 JOHN LOCKE, Liberty of the Press, reprinted in SOME THOUGHTS CONCERNING EDU-
CATION AND OF THE CONDUCT OF THE UNDERSTANDING, supra note 151, at 329, 337; see
also Justin Hughes, Copyright and Incomplete Historiographies:  Of Piracy, Propertization, and 
Thomas Jefferson, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 993, 1012 (2006) (discussing the memorandum in 
which Locke makes this argument). 
213 LOCKE, supra note 212, at 338. 
214 See supra Section II.B. 
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CONCLUSION
This Article seeks to uncover the ways in which the legal realists 
used intellectual property to revolutionize property theory in land 
when they began assembling the theoretical arguments for the mod-
ern administrative state.  This historical analysis is especially relevant 
today, and not just because, as John Duffy puts it, “[t]he most interest-
ing questions are the most fundamental.”215  It is important given the 
increased scholarly interest in the relationship between the adminis-
trative state and intellectual property, particularly patent law.  The in-
stitutional and doctrinal questions raised in Tafas v. Doll and in other 
recent court battles216 are proliferating, as is the scholarship analyzing 
patents and other intellectual property rights within a regulatory 
framework. 
Yet many scholars and lawyers remain unaware of the central role 
of intellectual property within the legal-realist property theory that 
underlies the administrative state.  Perhaps this is the case because the 
legal realists succeeded in their work.  The one-two punch of their 
nominalist bundle metaphor and their positivist exclusion conception 
of property soon became orthodoxy within property scholarship and 
among political elites.  This helped justify the modern administrative 
state because it made property sufficiently plastic to permit the regula-
tion of its use and disposition by myriad state and federal regulatory 
agencies.  By the mid–twentieth century, the administrative state was 
firmly cemented into the American political system, as Americans no 
longer lived with what legal realist Walton Hamilton referred to as the 
“imminent hazards to life, liberty, and property” caused by “un-
planned and undirected industrialism.”217  It is not a coincidence that, 
at the same time as the establishment of the modern administrative 
state, Charles Reich could safely assert as incontrovertible truth that 
“[p]roperty is not a natural right but a deliberate construction by so-
ciety.”218
These two propositions—the evolution of the administrative state 
and the nominalist-positivist revolution in property theory—were 
deeply intertwined in the scholarship of the legal realists working in 
215 Duffy, supra note 1, at 1071. 
216 See, e.g., Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 442 F.3d 1345, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2006) 
(holding that patents are not constitutional private property within the ambit of the 
Takings Clause because “patent rights are a creature of federal law”). 
217 Hamilton, supra note 53, at 880. 
218 Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 771 (1964). 
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the Progressive Era.  At the heart of this theoretical work was intellec-
tual property.  This insight does not by itself settle any particular insti-
tutional or legal question concerning the relationship between the 
administrative state and intellectual property, but that does not mean 
that this intellectual history is an idle academic inquiry.  The legal re-
alists spawned a conventional wisdom concerning the inherent con-
ceptual incoherence of Lockean property theory and the success of 
the positivist exclusion conception of property.  This conventional 
wisdom is all too often taken for granted within modern intellectual 
property scholarship, which frequently assumes incorrectly that intel-
lectual property and Lockean property theory are, at best, strange 
bedfellows, and, at worst, outright adversaries.  As such, this intellec-
tual history contains important lessons for scholars seeking to bring 
the legal realists’ arguments full circle in integrating the administra-
tive state with intellectual property doctrines. 
